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 NOËTIC AND PARADIGMATIC TRUTH 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Philosophy is the result of the Greek experiment to understand the world as we see it by 
reason, not by divine revelation, sacred texts, or tradition
1
. It was born around 600 B.C.
2
. At 
that time, the Chinese developed their Confucian and Taoist views of the world based on 
tradition and the “way” of meditation. In India the Hindu view based on the Veda was born3. 
The people of Israel had their prophets who interpreted the word of their monotheistic God. 
The Celts had their Druids
4
. Even the Greeks had their mythology, handed down to us by 
Hesiod. All these worldviews were in one way or the other the work of belief. But certain 
Greeks such as Thales (fl. C. 585 B.C.), Anaximander (c.612-545 B.C.), Anaximenes started 
asking questions that required an answer by reason. They affirmed indirectly that the world we 
live in is accessible to human reason. For the first time in history, the full dignity of the human 
mind was asserted. With the Greeks science was born. They wanted to know what is true. Their 
experiment led to the great philosophies of Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.).  
 
Now truth, saying things as they are, is a relation between what we think and what is. 
When I say that the sun is shining, I tell the truth when by looking outside I actually observe it 
to be sunny
5
. I say the truth when what I say corresponds to what is. Truth is then a transitive 
relation of correspondence. Truth is the correspondence of thought to what is.
6
 
 
                                                 
1
 The French Dictionary « Lalande », gives as first definition of the word « philosophy » : « Savoir rationnel, 
science, au sens le plus général du mot ». 
2
 A time in the history of the world Jaspers calls the “Axial epoch”, i.e. a period when the fundamental views of 
the world took on a different shape in several of the then existing civilizations. 
3
 Cf. Audi, « Vedas » 
4
 Jean-Louis Brunaux sees the druids as « Philosophers of the Barbarians ». But he does not define what 
philosophy is exactly, and he shows only that the Druids were in contact with Pythagoras, or his descendant 
disciples. But is Pythagoras to be considered a philosopher? Kirk, Raven, and Schofield in their classic work on 
the Presocratic Philosophers, maintain: “Pythagoras, we must conclude, was a philosopher only to the extent that 
he was a sage” (p. 238), and: “... the impulse underlying Pythagoreanism was a religious one ...” (p.213) 
5
 I had first written “When I say this tree is green”, but Prof. B.Giovannini tells me that this is not a good example, 
that green is also partially the result of a synthesis by the brain. 
6
 Being a basic concept in philosophy, truth has received many interpretations. Medieval philosophy in particular 
developed quite a theory of truth, but the question is by no means closed and has lately been raised again. It 
distinguished the truth of beings (veritas essendi) from the truth of propositions (veritas cognoscendi). The veritas 
essendi is the truth of beings ; it presupposes an ideal model – the idea God has of beings – and is attributed when 
the being in question resembles this model, when it is a « true human being », etc.. The veritas cognoscendi is the 
truth of propositions. Our distinction is exclusively on the level of this truth and maintains that either our ideas 
correspond to the object of our thought, or the object of our thought corresponds to the idea we have of it. For a 
clear and concise treatment of truth in the history of philosophy, cf Jolivet, passim. 
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But if truth is a transitive relation of correspondence, it can go both ways. Instead of the 
agreement of thought to things, it could also be the agreement of things to thought. In that case, 
I say true in as far as the thing I am talking about corresponds to my thought of it. When we say 
Kant is a “true” – real – philosopher, we want to say that Kant corresponds to the idea of a 
philosopher. The architect, too, makes his vision, his blueprint of the house come true.  
 
If then there are two truths, there should also be two types of philosophy, one type that 
tries to give an accurate picture of the world based on experience and reason, another type that 
tries to envisage a world that corresponds to human ideals, a mental world conceived to become 
true. As the first type of truth requires at its start a description, or contemplation, of what is, I 
shall call it “noëtic philosophy”, from the Geek “νόησις”, meaning observation, understanding, 
thought. The second type of truth, things corresponding to our thoughts, leads inevitably to man 
intervening in the world and fashioning it according to his thoughts. I shall therefore call this 
type of philosophy “paradigmatic”, from the Greek ”пαрάδειγμα”, model, example. One could 
also call it poietic, from “ποιειν”, to produce, to make. Both types of thought, noetic as well as 
pararadigmatic or poietic thought, presuppose as an axiom that the world is somehow rational, 
that the human mind in one way or the other can link up with the world man lives in. If the 
world were fully irrational so that one day trees would grow up, and another day they would 
grow down, or one day flower could be baked into bread but another day not, no thought about 
the world would be possible. There would be an unbridgeable gap between the rationality of the 
human mind and the irrationality of the world. 
 
If there is a noëtic and a paradigmatic type of philosophy, it stands to reason to expect 
two traditions in the history of philosophy.
7
 
 
 
In Greek philosophy, the first known thinker to initiate noëtic thought was Heraclitus. 
Paradigmatic thought started with Parmenides (500 appr.- appr. 400 B. C.), and it culminated in 
the philosophy of Plato. The Platonic tradition held firm during the Middle Ages. In modern 
times, it started again on a new basis with Descartes (1596- 1650) to culminate in the 
philosophy of Hegel, who brought it to its perfection. Noëtic thought was represented in Greece 
in particular by Heraclitus (~VI - ~V century B.C.) and culminated in the grand enterprise of 
                                                 
7
 The two truths are known in the tradition of philosophy as a correspondence theory of truth and a coherence 
theory of truth 
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Aristotle. It was rediscovered during the Middle Ages in the theology of Thomas of Aquinas 
(1224/25 – 1274), but then more or less disappeared from the scene. In recent times some 
Existentialists, such as Heidegger (1889 – 1976) and especially Jaspers (1883 – 1969) 
developed their thoughts on a noëtic basis
8
. 
 
This dual tradition in philosophy led, and still leads, many thinkers to oppose one to the 
other, Aristotelians refuting followers of Plato, and vice versa. But if one understands that there 
are two truths, one should also see that the two approaches to truth are complementary. 
Whereas noëtic philosophy helps us better understand the world, our society, our existence, 
paradigmatic philosophy shows us all the possibilities of creative thought and its laws. It led to 
the discovery of the modern sciences thus enabling man to fashion the world according to his 
own vision. For man to develop the full potentiality of his mind and the management of his 
world, he needs the co-operation of both. Noëtic thought by itself helps us understand life and 
thus lead a life with greater depth, but without paradigmatic thought it leads to a static barren 
world deprived of human innovation. Paradigmatic thought as such adapts the world to our 
needs and our desires, but without noëtic thought it looses contact with reality and creates 
monsters that in the end prove to be destructive. 
 
In order to detect this noëtic and paradigmatic tradition in philosophy, one should 
distinguish the structure of these two types of thought. It is by their structure that one can 
distinguish the two philosophies and determine whether a given thinker belongs to one or the 
other tradition, just as it is by their inner structure that one can discover the use and function of 
a building, whatever the facade may be. 
The Structure of Noëtic thought. 
All thought has its source in experience. Without any observation whatsoever, human 
thought can have no content. Even our most fictional visions still deal with things or situations 
we have observed, even if they transform them into a different world. 
 
Thought starts when it asks questions of the things we observe. Noëtic thought asks the 
question children pose so often of the “what” and the “why”. ”What is this thing?” or “Why is 
this?” Of course, when philosophers pose those questions, they do not look for immediate 
answers or definitions. They do not ask what this particular animal is, or why trains move. 
                                                 
8
 Other Existentialists, such as Sartre, resolutely adhere to paradigmatic thought.
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They want to know what it means to be an animal, what is the difference between animals and 
things, or what movement is, and why it is. They are looking for the essence of things and for 
ultimate causes. They want to understand what ‘animality’ is, or what is the cause that accounts 
for all movement in the world.  
 
In order therefore to better understand the world we live in, noëtic thought travels from 
the concrete to the abstract, for it is in the region of the abstract that it hopes to find the 
principles that govern our world. Aristotle gives us a good example. When asking what a statue 
is, he answers that it is bronze that has been given a certain form by the sculptor. The bronze is 
the material the sculptor used to give the statue his form. Aristotle then generalises by saying 
that things are made up of form and matter. The definition of things, the ‘what’, must therefore 
mention the form and matter. Man, for example, is a rational animal. He is an animal just as a 
dog and a monkey are animals, but his ‘animality’ carries the form of reason9. In the same way 
a statue of Socrates is bronze having received the form of the image of Socrates, and a 
residence is a building incorporating the form of dwelling. 
In schematic form, one could represent noëtic thought in this manner: 
First principle    Theory   Application 
 
Intuition 
 
 
Experience of things 
Question: What and why? 
       Experience of things 
 
In giving us the definition of things, form and matter explain to us what things are, that 
is to say they explain why things are what they are. Form and matter are the intrinsic causes of 
things that determine what things are. By discovering form and matter Aristotle discovered at 
the same time the first causes meant to explain things. 
 
The Structure of Paradigmatic thought. 
 
                                                 
9
 cf. Philippe, pp. 92 –97. 
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Paradigmatic thought also starts with experience and then negates it. The work of an 
architect is a good example. The architect knows by experience what a building must be to be a 
family home. But he puts the plans of houses he already knows out of his mind, at the time he 
wants to conceive a new home. In this sense he partly negates experience, and this gives him a 
universal vision of what a home has to be for him. He finds this vision in his mind, and he will 
apply this to the world when building a family home. 
 
Paradigmatic or poietic thought implies three concepts: the universal idea of what it 
means to be a home, the model i.e. a picture of a specific home, and thirdly the material of 
which the house is made. Between the three, there is a logical relation of contrariness. The 
particular model (blue print) stands in contrast to the universal idea of a house, their relation is 
one of contrariness. And both are put together in the actual house built, which is the synthesis. 
Hegel’s logic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis applies exactly to the schema of paradigmatic 
thought.  
 
In schematic form: 
 
Universal idea      Model 
 
   Technical knowledge 
 
Experience put between brackets     Produced Model 
 
 
Experience of things     Material 
 
A feature that strikes, is the productiveness of paradigmatic thought. Paradigmatic 
thought has its production inscribed in it, this in contrast to noëtic thought that only observes, 
but does not try to transform the world. Paradigmatic truth is a transitive act, in the terms of 
Aristotle.  
 
If one considers the universal idea as such, which is based on a kind of inspiration, one 
notices that their main characteristic is beauty. Models thought out by man are always 
beautiful, and this is exactly their attractiveness; visions of the world based on paradigmatic 
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thought attract because they are beautiful. Marx is a good example; a Marxist world, is a 
beautiful world based on the co-operation of its different factors. 
 
Noëtic thought having the object of its thought as a measure can understand 
paradigmatic thought, it can include it in its view of reality, Whereas paradigmatic thought 
cannot understand noëtic; it can just develop a project of it. It follows that the analysis of 
philosophic thought must be undertaken from the noëtic point of view. 
 
In conclusion, one may say that noëtic thought reproduces the world in the same way 
we encounter it, whereas paradigmatic thought transforms the world. A purely noëtic view of 
the world is static, whereas a paradigmatic world is a world of transformations without limits. 
In the end, a crazy world without limits. Secondly, a paradigmatic world has as its final value 
beauty, whereas a noëtic world has as it highest moral value the good.  
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 PARADIGMATIC AND NOËTIC TRENDS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 The first philosopher known in Greek philosophy was Thales who lived in 
Bogdum around 600 before Christ. We know little of his life – was he married, had he 
children? Except that he had the reputation of being a “wise” man, that is a man who knows a 
great deal. He is reputed to have been an engineer. 
 
Thales is considered to be the father of philosophy, not because of the answers he gave, 
but rather because of the question he asked: where does everything come from, what is the first 
principle of all things, the underlying cause? His answer is less philosophical for he said that 
the first cause of everything is water. This is manifestly false. When I take a glass of water I do 
not find the whole of reality in my glass. When Thales spoke of water he must have thought of 
something else. The water he spoke of is a kind of cosmic water, universal water that should 
not be confounded with the particular water we drink. Now water at the time of Thales was a 
religious notion
10
. It stood for the first matter of which every thing is made by the creator god. 
Water has all the qualities of this material: it has no colour, can take any form, and it is 
transparent. But it is a cosmological notion, not primary a philosophical one. So if the question 
Thales asked was philosophical, the answer he gave was rather religious. Whatever one may 
hold – and the discussion on Thales is not finished – it remains that by his question Thales has 
started a philosophical tradition that distanced itself from purely religious thought
11
. 
 
 This book is not a history of philosophy; we will not treat all the Greek 
philosophers. But we shall single out those thinkers that are important for our enterprise. In 
Greek philosophy, the first known thinker to initiate noëtic thought was Heraclitus of Ephesus, 
born around 504 to 501 B.C. He was a hereditary Basileus of the city, but relinquished this 
office in favour of his brother. He was somewhat melancholy and expressed his contempt for 
men in general, and the citizen of Ephesus in particular. He is known to be difficult to 
understand, and gained the nickname of the “obscure”12. We have only some fragments of his 
                                                 
10
 Cf Eliade, pp.129 -132 
11
 Thales’s disciples, Anaximander and Anaximenes, abandon this reference to religious notions. For Anaximander 
the original stuff from which everything comes is the indeterminate, the άπειρον, whereas for Anaximenes it is 
Air, άήρ (Cf Kirk, pp 105 ff, 146, Copleston 41, 43) 
12
 Cf. Copleston, History,  p. 55. 
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works. Of which the most fundamental attributed to him, although no fragment states this 
explicitly, is: “All things are in a state of flux,   πάντά ρει.”   But this becoming of all things we 
see has a certain regularity. Heraclitus accordingly states: “Listening not to me but to the 
Logos, it is wise to affirm that all things are one.”13 In other words, the changes we observe in 
the world are of certain types: after winter comes summer, after life, death. Heraclitus is a 
philosopher of unity in difference. What this unity, that he calls “Logos”, may be is one of the 
central problems Heraclitus left us. However obscure Heraclitus may be, it is a fact of daily 
life, that all things are in a flux of becoming, even if they appear to remain the same. Heraclitus 
is the first noëtic thinker in our tradition, and being the first, it is normal that he leaves a 
number of questions. A pioneer thinker cannot solve all the questions. 
 
As concerns the paradigmatic tradition, one can mention in the first place Parmenides
14
, 
who was a citizen of Elea and lived very probably in the 6
th
 Century B.C.
15
 Parmenides wrote 
in verse. He is thought to have written in reaction to Heraclitus. After the proem, the poem falls 
in two parts, the first expounding “the tremorless heart of well-rounded Truth”, the second part 
explaining the opinion of the mortals, “in which there is no true conviction”16. In the proem, he 
tells that he is transported by the daughters of the sun to the Goddess of Justice, who teaches 
him that Being, the One is, but that Becoming, Change is an illusion. “It is proper that you 
should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, and the opinion of 
mortals in which there is no true reliance”17 And the goddess teaches Parmenides that being is, 
and that Non-being is not. This is the road of conviction, since it follows truth. She also teaches 
Parmenides that thought and being are the same
18
. 
 
This is, of course, visibly wrong. We do experience becoming, and thought is not the 
same as being in our daily life. As a result, Parmenides’s thought has led to all kinds of 
interpretations, of which it is difficult to say which one is right. But whatever one may think 
about this, Parmenides’s idea of a trip to the Godhead implies leaving the world of daily 
experience, and his leading principle, that ‘Being is’ is a formulation by thought that has all the 
features of paradigmatic thought. Parmenides separates “Reason and Sense, Truth and 
                                                 
13
 Diels, fragment 50. 
14
 Cf. Copleston, History, pp.64 to 70 
15
 Plato tells that Parmenides met Socrates in Athens at the occasion of the Great Panathenea.(Kirk, p.239).  
16
 Kirk, p. 241f. 
6 Diels ,
pp. 230 
18
 Diels.p. 231 
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Appearance”19 And in so doing he creates a world of thought that is surely necessary, and an 
ideal of thinking, but not a description of the world such as we experience it. It would seem that 
Parmenides is the father of paradigmatic thought. 
 
Plato (427-347 B.C.)
20
 brings the paradigmatic tradition of Socrates
21
 to full bloom. The 
best way to understand his philosophy is by the allegory of the Cave in the seventh book of the 
Republic, and the section on the soul’s ascent to beauty in the Symposium, a dialogue that 
inspired Plotinus and forms the basis of his thought. In the allegory of the Cave, Plato clearly 
states that the world we know and live in is a prison, a world of appearances that hides the true 
nature of things. Plato describes the true nature of things in the Symposium, when Socrates is 
instructed in the affairs of love by a priestess, Diotima.
22
: 
 “These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to 
the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue 
them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain.”23  
The way of love is the way of the philosopher and passes through the following degrees: 
“And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the objects of love is to begin 
from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as 
steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to 
their practices and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the 
notion of absolute beauty,...” 24 
 
Plato expresses here, following Socrates, the ideal of paradigmatic thought in all its 
noble forms, the ideal of beauty. For him the good is beauty
25
. Paradigmatic thought does not 
say, or explain, what is but it says what should be. It is therefore the ideal locus to say what the 
aspirations of man should be, and Plato thinks it should be beauty, which is indeed an essential 
characteristic of any paradigmatic inspiration. In this way, Plato described the ideal of justice, 
of society, etc. With Plato the dignity of paradigmatic thought receives its noblest expression, 
and it is not by chance that Plato wrote the Republic, the blueprint of an ideal state. As a 
paradigmatic thinker such architecture of society was practically an obligation. 
                                                 
19
 Cf.Copleston, History, p.65 
20
 Cf. Coplestone, History, 151 to 288. 
21
 When Socrates asks « What is courage, piety, justice, beauty ? » he is really looking for paradigms 
22
 Platon, Symposium, 204 c 6,  
23
 Symposium, 210. 
24
 Symposium, 211,  
25
 Cf. Copleston I,I p.200, 202 
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The separation between Plato and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) comes from their basic 
manner of conceiving the world. Plato is paradigmatic in his thinking, whereas Aristotle is 
noëtic. As such, he cannot understand Plato, even if he was the most important spokesman of 
Plato’s Academy. His critique of Plato is conceived from the noëtic point of view, and can 
therefore never bring an understanding of Plato’s thought. We are here in front of two basically 
different ways of thinking
26
.  
 
We already mentioned the discovery of formal and material cause in Aristotle’s work as 
proof of his noëtic philosophy. One should add the final and efficient causes as typical noëtic 
discoveries. Aristotle writes on this subject: 
“Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes (for we say we know 
each thing only when we think we recognise its first causes), and causes are spoken of in four 
senses. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. the essence (for the ‘why’ is reducible 
finally to the definition, and the ultimate ‘why’ is a cause and principle); in another the matter 
or substratum, in a third the source of all change, and in a fourth the cause opposed to this, the 
purpose and the good (for this is the end of all generation and change)
27
 
Aristotle does not stress the exemplary cause, although he mentioned the "paradigma" 
as a cause
28, “the house comes from the house that is in the mind”. Taking into account his 
critique of Plato it stands to reason that he should give less importance to paradigmatic 
functions of thought.
29
 
 
These five causes led in Scholastic thought to the five transcendentals, basic levels of 
being that are convertible, and analogous. The final cause leads to the good, the efficient cause 
to “aliquid”, the other, the formal cause to “verum”, determination, the material cause to “res”, 
being, and the exemplary cause to “unum”, coherence. 
 
                                                 
26
 As such, noëtic thought can understand paradigmatic thought, since its truth is the agreement with the object of 
thought. Whereas paradigmatic thought cannot understand noëtic thought ; it can only present models of noëtic 
thought. If Aristote did not understand Platon, this was for personal reasons. 
27
 Met. A 3, 983 a 22 – 983 a 33 
28
 Cf. Met. A 9, D 2, M 4. 
29
 Met. Z  9 1034a23 : “Thus we need not  posit a Platonic Form as pattern, for living things are what are most 
truly substances, and there would be a Form here if anywhere” 
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Medieval Philosophy
30
 started with Augustine (354-430)
31
 and ended with William of 
Ockham (1285-1349)
32
. Until the time of Albert the Great (died 1280) and Thomas of Aquino 
(c. 1224-1274), the philosophy of Aristotle was not yet translated, except for the translations of 
Aristotelian logic by Boethius (c.480-525), and medieval thought based itself mainly on the 
thought of St. Augustin, who was deeply influenced by Plato. One understands why medieval 
theologians would turn to Plato; the works of Aristotle were not available, and Plato talks about 
God. It is therefore quite understandable, that a Christian thinker would find in Plato an ally. 
But still an ally who in the last resort goes away and no longer follows him, as we will see
33
. As 
a result, Medieval philosophy until Thomas Aquinas who found the synthesis of Christian 
theology and Aristotle, sharpened its methods of thinking without raising the fundamental 
question of the status of paradigmatic thought, as will be done in modern thought
34
. Aquinas 
changed this and introduced Aristotelian noëtic philosophy into the landscape of thought. Thus 
he used in his quia arguments that go from effect to its cause the “Five Ways” Aristotle had 
already broached to show the existence of God. They all employ the principle of causality and 
start from empirical knowledge of the world to conclude to the existence of God
35
. 
 
Modern thought finds in Descartes (1596-1650) one of its first interpreters
36
. 
Paradigmatic thought begins with putting experience between brackets; in a similar way 
Descartes starts with a universal doubt. And the innate ideas are models of matter and spirit, 
                                                 
30
 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives an interesting definition : “ Here is a recipe for producing 
medieval philosophy: Combine classical pagan philosophy, mainly Greek but also in its Roman versions, with the 
new Christian religion. Season with a variety of flavorings from the Jewish and Islamic intellectual heritages. Stir 
an simmer for 1300 years or more, until done.” (Paul Vincent Spade) 
31
 Augustine started as a disciple of the Manichaean dualism between good and evil, then under the influence of 
friends in Milan, bishop Ambroise and other Christian Neoplatonists, broke with it, and converted to Christianity. 
Neoplatonic thought, which is an adaption of Platonic thought initiated by Plotin, became his mental mentor. In 
the Confessions he writes of the « Platonists » as preparing his way to Christianity (VIII, 9, 13-14). Augustine 
therefore belongs to the paradigmatic tradition. For a good introduction cf. Weischedel (pp.77-85), Markus and 
Maurer (pp.3-33). 
32
 An English Franciscan who tried to separate reason and revelation, that Thomas Aquinas had sought to unite, 
with the result that the sphere of natural truth became open to rational investigation unimpeded by metaphysical or 
theological considerations. In this sense Ockham is considered one of the founders of modern science. Cf Hoyt, 
pp. 600-602 
33
 The history of modern philosophy will show that paradigmatic thought, if taken by itself leads finally to an 
atheistic attitude. Cf. Pereboom, La Mort de Dieu. 
34
 A good example is the Ontological Argument of Anselm (c. 1033-1109), that tries to prove the existence of God 
from the notion that God is « something than which nothing greater can be conceived ». The argument has been 
refuted by Kant, but continues to attract philosophers (Russell, Hartshorne, Malcolm). From our point of view it is 
clear that paradigmatic thought does not have the capacity to create existence. Cf. John Hick, « Ontological 
Argument of the existence of God » 
35
 Cf  Aquinas, S.T., I, 2, 3 c, Aristotle, Physique VII, 1, 241 b , Copleston, Aquinas, pp. 110 - 126 
36
 Descartes does have some predecessors, cf. E.Gilson. 
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blueprints that Descartes himself compares to the architectural plans of a city.
37
 The dualism of 
matter and spirit is typical of paradigmatic thought. The aim of his philosophy is also typically 
paradigmatic, he wants to give the world not a speculative philosophy, but a practical 
philosophy, “by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, 
heavens and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know the different crafts of our 
artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and 
thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature [italics mine]”38 
 
Spinoza (1632-1677) is the first to present a coherent paradigmatic model of the world. 
His “Deus sive natura” is typically a model of the world, and it is therefore not surprising that 
he presents his ethical views in the form of a deductive mathematical manner. In this tradition 
Leibniz (1646-1716) introduced the notion of force. Against Descartes he thinks that extension 
alone cannot explain why things resist, and why in the case of animals it can become active 
even. To explain this resistance of matter Leibniz introduced the notion of force
39
 Berkeley’s 
(1685-1753) “Esse est percipi” is typically paradigmatic40. Against the conception of truth of 
Descartes Giambattista Vico (1668 – 1744) opposes his own definition of truth. Truth is not 
“clear and distinct” ideas, but verum factum, the true and the made are convertible41. Vico’s 
criticism of Descartes does not, however, represent a return to the noëtic conception of truth. 
His definition of truth as that which is made by man, is typically paradigmatic and foreshadows 
the evolution of the concept of truth in the paradigmatic tradition. David Hume (1711-76) 
shows that in a paradigmatic context the idea of cause is a product of human custom
42
:  
“Necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal 
impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another.”43 
In Kantian terms, Hume only accepts a priori analytic and a posteriori synthetic 
judgements. Hume thought he had discovered the same “gentle force” that had brought Newton 
to his law of gravitation. Hume also maintains that paradigmatic thought cannot attain the 
transcendent: 
                                                 
37
 Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, Oeuvres VI, pp.11f –For a very good treatment of the social intentions of 
modern philosophy, cf. Becker,, a conference given in 1932. 
38
 Descartes, Discours on the Method, part VI, Haldane, p. 119. 
39
 Weischedel, p. 146 
40
 Although Berkeley states that philosophy is « the study of wisdom and truth » (Berkeley, p.93), he does not, to 
the best of my knowledge, define what he means with truth. But he adheres clearly to the Cartesian school of 
thought. (Cf Warnock, p. 132) 
41
 Gardiner, Patrick, p.248 
42
 For an excellent synoptic view of British Philosophy, cf Quinton 
43
 Hume, p.49. 
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“If we take in hand any volume ; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us 
ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity of number? No. Does it 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it 
then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
44
 
 
Kant (1724-1804), who admits that David Hume (1711-1776) awoke him from his 
“dogmatic sleep”45, is the first philosopher in modern history to have seen that there are two 
types of truth
46
:  
Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must conform to the objects; but, 
under that supposition, all attempts to establish anything about them a priori, by means of 
concepts, and thus to enlarge our knowledge, have come to nothing. The experiment therefore 
ought to be made, whether we should not succeed better with the problems of metaphysic, by 
assuming that the objects must conform to our mode of cognition, for this would better agree 
with the demanded possibility of an a priori knowledge of them...
47
 
 
Kant recognises the architectural aspect of paradigmatic thought
48
 and his philosophy is 
important for the paradigmatic tradition in two aspects. On the one hand, his philosophy 
established clearly the paradigmatic capacity of human thought and gave its language the 
logical form of a priory synthetic statements. A priori for they are not inferences from 
experience, but are based on the inspiration of the philosopher; synthetic because they say what 
reality should be. On the other hand his philosophy also showed that paradigmatic thought is 
agnostic and cannot attain God. God becomes the object of pure belief
49
. He proves this by 
showing that arguments for and against the existence of God are equally valid. Since he cannot 
attain God, man becomes the source and judge of his moral action. 
                                                 
44
 Hume, p. 193 
45
 Kant Prolegomena, 260; Hume had written: “If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school 
metaphysics, for instance, let us ask; Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. 
Does is contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the 
flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and confusion”(Hendel, p.192f) It gave Kant the idea of critical 
philosophy, i.e. one has to be clear about the logical status of metaphysical propositions (Körner, p.16) 
46
 Thomas Aquinas had already seen this, but gave a theological explanation: God has a paradigmatic knowledge 
of his creation: “Things as well as knowledge are said to be true...Knowledge is true in as far as it is in accord with 
the objects of knowledge, whereas things are true in as far as they imitate the divine intellect which is their 
measure....” De Veritate, Qu. 1, a.8. 
47
 Greene p. 14 
48
 Cf. Heimsoeth, p. 789. 
49
 Cf Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. B. 669 : « Das höchste Wesen ... dessen objektive Realität auf diesem 
Wege zwar nicht bewiesen, aber auch nicht widerlegt werden kann,.... », cf also Kritik der Urteilskraft, p. 343 : 
« ... the existence of God and immortality are matters of fait (res fidei)... » 
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Kant’s philosophy had a great influence on the philosophical thought of the 19th 
Century. Fichte (1762-1814) sees himself as a true disciple of Kant, and proposes in his ethical 
idealism to be a “living exemplar of the categorical imperative”50. In the “Das System der 
Sittenlehre (1798)” Fichte writes: “... the mind knows necessarily itself completely, ... and a 
system of the mind is possible. ...Either all philosophy must be abandoned, or the absolute 
autonomy of the mind must be accepted”51 In a similar way Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) 
sees his philosophy as the completion of the philosophy of Kant
52
. He thinks that the thing in 
itself, the noumenon, of Kant is in reality the will, and Schopenhauer introduces in this manner 
the notion of the will that will play such an important role in Nietzsche’s thought53. 
 
Hegel (1770-1831) represents a synthesis in the double Hegelian meaning of being a 
conclusion and a starting point for novel antitheses. After Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”54, 
he did not need to make the breach with everyday experience, but he could start right away 
with his inspiration. He thus managed to conceive a paradigmatic philosophy that does not 
exclude any part of reality
55
. Since the measure of paradigmatic thought for Hegel is not reality 
as experienced but this very thought itself
56
, the knowledge of ultimate reality (Metaphysics) 
becomes with Hegel knowledge of this knowledge, i.e. Logic
57
. The philosophy of Hegel 
becomes in this way the system of this very knowledge, i.e. Spirit. Reality understood in terms 
of a paradigmatic project that makes itself, implies dialectics as the process of this very 
realisation
58
 and Spirit as the subject of dialectics. That is why Hegel blames Spinoza and 
                                                 
50
 Tsanoff, p. 194 
51
 Fichte, System der Sittenlehre, pp.57f. Cf also p.89 : »Ich kann nicht sein für mich, ohne Etwas zu sein... Der 
Vereinigungspunkt zwischen beiden liegt darin dass ich für mich nur durch absolute Selbsttätigkeit zufolge eines 
Begriffes bin,... » 
52
 Cf. Schopenhauer, Bd IV, p. 166 « dass meine Philosophie nur das Zu-Ende-Denken der seinigen [Kant] sei. » 
53
 Schopenhauer discovered also the unconscious and its relation to sexuality well before Freud. Cf Gardiner, 
p.329. 
54
, Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B xvi, Greene, p. xxxvii, Körner, p. 30 
55
 With the exception of Mr Krug’s pen. Mr Krug wrote to Hegel a letter in which he asked Hegel to deduce the 
pen with which he was writing the letter. Hegel answered (Enzyklopädie, § 250) in a « contemptuous and sarcastic 
footnote in which he states that philosophy had more important matters to concern itself with than Krug’s pen. » 
(Stace, p. 308). Paradigmatic thought can propose models of reality, but it cannot create things, although it can 
bring man to produce things, such as Mr Krug’s pen. 
56
 Hegel Enzyklopädie, § 213 : « denn die Wahrheit ist dies, dass die Objecktivität dem Begriffe entspricht,... » 
57
 Hegel’s logic is typically paradigmatic. Hegel’s Contradiction is in fact the opposition of contrary concepts : 
Thesis (universal idea) – Antithesis (technical knowledge), as the opposites within the Synthesis (model), Being – 
Nothing, as opposites within the group of Becoming. Cf Stace § 128, 138 
58
 Wissenshaft der Logik, Pars I, p.36 
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Schelling
59
 to have seen Spirit only in terms of identity with reality (substance) without taking 
into account the dynamism, the realisation of Spirit asks for
60
.: 
 
Es kommt nach meiner Einsicht, welche sich nur durch die Darstellung des Systems 
selbst rechtfertigen muss, alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern eben so sehr 
als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrucken
61
 
 
The Substance which is Spirit is becoming and at the same time in itself
62
, that is 
Subject. The life of Spirit is action (Tat), and action presupposes a material that is worked on 
and transformed
63
. This work of the spirit, this process of self-realisation, is history through 
which spirit becomes itself
64
, culminating in Germanic culture
65
 
 
Hegel’s paradigmatic philosophy which regards reality as a project that realises itself 
through the work of history cannot be silent about God, as Kant did. Hegel identifies God with 
the Spirit and he develops a theology in which the Trinity corresponds exactly to the phases of 
the history of the Spirit
66
. But the God of Hegel’s paradigmatic philosophy is not and cannot be 
the God of Abraham, or of Christianity. Hegel understands divine life in terms of the history of 
the development of God
67
. This history includes the antithetic negation of God in man by the 
creation. Since for the Spirit knowledge of himself is knowledge through the other
68
, God has 
to become his other. God knowing Himself in man implies the knowledge of God by man, a 
knowledge that develops as knowledge of self in God
69
. The result is that the divine history 
becomes the history of the divination of man by himself. By realising God man realises 
                                                 
59
 Cf. Hegel’s remark that Schelling’s Absolute is like « the night in which all cows are black «  Phän. P. 19  
60
 Hegel, Enzyklopädie, § 573 : « Am genauesten würden sie [die Panhteisten] als die Systeme bestimmt welche 
das Absolute nur als die Substanz fassen ... Der Mangel dieser sämtlichen Vorstellungsweisen und Systeme ist, 
nicht zur Bestimmung der Substanz als Subjekt und als Geist fortzugehen » 
61
 Phänomenologie,p.19 « Es kommt nach meiner Einsicht... alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substaz aber eben 
so sehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrukcen» 
62
 Hegel Phänomenologie, p. 558 : « Diese Substanz aber, die der Geist ist, ist das Werden seiner zu dem, was er 
an sich ist ; » 
63
 Hegel Einleitung, p. 13 : »Sein Leben ist Tat . Die Tat hat einen vorhandenen Stoff zu ihrer Voraussetzung, auf 
welchen sie gerichet ist und den sie nicth etwa bloss vermehrt...sondern wesentlich bearbeitet  und umbi lde t  » 
64
 Hegel Vorlesungen, p. 72 : « Der Geist it wesentlich Resultat seiner Tätigkeit... » 
65
 Hegel, Weltgeschichte, p.254 
66
 Hegel Ibid, p. 58 : « Im Christentum aber ist Gott als Geist offenbart, und zwar zuerst Vater, Macht, abstrakt 
Allgemeines das noch eingehüllt ist, zweitens ist er sich als Gegenstand, ein Anderes seiner selbst, ein sich 
Entzweitendes, der Sohn » 
67
 Hegel, Ibid. p.48 : « Die Geschichte ist die Entfaltung der Natur Gottes... » 
68
 Hegel Phänomenologie, p.528 : « Denn der Geist ist das Wissen seiner Selbst in seiner Entäusserung ; » 
69
 Hegel Enzyklopädie, § 564 : « Gott ist nur Gott, insofern er sich selber weiss ; sein Sich-wissen ist ferner ein 
Selbstbewusstsein im Menschen und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott, das fortgeht zum Sich-wissen des 
Menschen in Gott. » 
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himself, with the result that the service of God is overtaken by the worship of the Spirit and 
theology is overtaken by Hegel’s philosophy70. Hegel’s paradigmatic philosophy sees itself as 
the creator of a blueprint of reality
71
. If Plato’s philosophy presented the architecture of the 
ideal State, the Republic, Hegel’s philosophy becomes the architect of ideal (virtuous?) reality. 
And it follows step by step the method of paradigmatic thought explained before. 
 
Hegel’s philosophy led to three main reactions. The young Hegelians were divided in 
three groups: “left-wing Hegelians ”, “right-wing Hegelians” “Old Hegelians”72. The Old 
Hegelians were loyal disciples of Hegel’s philosophy; they were in general defenders of 
Christianity
73
. The right-wing Hegelians were all professors at universities who applied Hegel’s 
method to different domains of thought (“resistance to materialism”, naturalism, and 
empiricism;...metaphysical idealism,;...historical direction...continuing preoccupation with 
Hegel’s own central themes”74). The left-wing Hegelians stress the productive aspect of 
Hegel’s philosophy, and in doing this, they discover the atheistic trend of his paradigmatic 
philosophy.  
 
Thus, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 – 1972) affirms that God is the projection of the ideal of 
being human
75
. God is the task that man gives himself and the meaning of history is the 
production of the ideal of man. The atheist negates the existence of God without negating the 
divine attributes as human ideals to be realised. As a result Feuerbach writes that “Christian 
religion ... is an idée fixe that is in glaring contradiction with our fire and life insurances, our 
railways and steam engines, our art galleries and sculpture museums, our war and trade 
schools, our theatres and natural history cabinets”76 
 
                                                 
70
 Enzyklopädie § 572 : »Dies Wissen ist damit  der denkend erkannte Begriff der Kunst und Religion, in welchem 
das in dem InhalteVerschiedene als notwendig und dies Notwendige als frei ekannt ist. » 
71
 Hegel follows quite precisely the schema of paradigmatic thought. His Metaphysics/Logic corresponds to the 
inspiration, his philosophy of nature to the materials, and the philosophy of spirit becomes the blue print of reality. 
This parallel between Hegel and paradigmatic though explains why for Hegel contradictions become in reality 
contraries. 
72
 The division was established by D.F. Strauss in his book Life of Jesus (1835-1836),on the model of the French 
parliament. Crites, p.452. 
73
 Crites, p.451. 
74
 Crites, p.454. 
75
 Feuerbach, Vol.4, p.71 : « der Glaube an Gott - ... –nur der Glaube des Menschen an sich ist », Vol.5, p.213 : 
« Wie Gott nichts anders ist als das Wesen des Menschen, gereinigt von dem , was dem menschlichen 
Individuum,...als Schranke, als Übel erscheint...», Vol 5, p. 217 : « der Glaube an Gott ist daher der Glaube des 
Menschen an sein eignes Wesen... » 
76
 Feuerbach, Vol 5, p. 414. 
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Marx (1818-1883) takes up the atheism of Feuerbach, by emphasising the hidden 
relation between atheism and the realisation of an ideal humanity. If philosophy becomes 
anthropology with Feuerbach, it becomes practical ideology with Marx
77
 For to him only an 
atheistic humanity could attain the ideal of man including the absolute standard of being 
human. Man who believes in God, projects his ideal in God, and rests passive in front of the 
God it believes to be perfect. As a result, atheism as a process of reducing God to 
anthropomorphic dimensions is the condition sine qua non of producing the ideal man. With 
Marx paradigmatic philosophy becomes the blueprint of an ideal society. His atheism is based 
on the belief in the glorious future of man
78
. He seeks to establish in Löwith’s words: “a 
Kingdom of God, without God and on earth, which is the ultimate goal and ideal of Marx’s 
historical messianism.”79. With Marx paradigmatic thought becomes a blue print of society, but 
it makes of man as he is the material for the ideal man, the communist, just as the house for the 
architect demands bricks to be built. Ernst Bloch (1885-1977), a Marxist philosopher, has seen 
it quite clearly, without drawing the conclusion that imposes itself. For him utopian society, 
classless society, represents “a new order of salvation, namely for the human material”80 It 
expresses quite clearly the utopian hope paradigmatic thought rouses, and at the same time the 
fact that man becomes in such a utopian paradigmatic society a function of these very hopes, 
material
81
. He ceases to be a person, but becomes a function. 
 
Another reaction to Hegel’s paradigmatic blueprint of reality is Sören Kierkegaard’s 
leap into faith. Kierkegaard was in Berlin when Hegel died and afterwards he attended the 
lectures of Schelling (1775-1854), who took Hegel’s place after his death. In his lectures 
Schelling stressed the importance of existence, and this gave Kierkegaard the idea of his 
“subjective thought”. This subjective thought takes the form of the considerations of a believer 
without claiming to be philosophy. In this sense Kierkegaard is a true disciple of Kant who 
already had seen that in a paradigmatic world (paradigmatic) philosophy must remain silent 
                                                 
77
 Marx, p. 535 : « Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur veschieden interpretiert, es kommt darauf an sie zu 
verändern » 
78
 Karl Loewith sees in Marx the « Jew of Old Testament stature » (p.44). His theory is a heresy of ancient Jewish 
messianism (p. 45) 
79
 Löwith, p. 42. 
80
 Bloch, p.621 : « eine neue Heilsordnung, nämlich für den Menschenstoff, zieht auf ». Bloch is not the only nor 
the best know marxist philosopher, and marxists question his orthodoxy, especially his Jewis background and his 
interest for religion. But he is a good representative of the « titanic » stream in Marxism (Cf McInnes: « Marxist 
Philosophy ») 
81
 Popper (1902-1994) has seen it quite clearly. Talking about utopian rationalism, he writes : « However 
benevolent its ends, it does not bring happiness, but only the familiar misery of being condemned to live under a 
tyrannical government » Popper, « Utopia and Violence », p,360 
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about God, only faith can give an answer to questions of God. Indeed Kierkegaard represents 
the first revolt against paradigmatic philosophy, leaving all paradigmatic thought behind itself. 
By his emphasis on and analysis of the existing subject he can be considered the father of 
existentialism, although, as he saw himself, his writings are not philosophy but “religious 
thought”82 
 
The atheism of Marx is founded on the belief in the glorious future of man. 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) formulates an atheism without belief or hope, and he is the first to 
introduce the will as the principle of life. For Schopenhauer it is impossible that the personal 
God of theism exist. If God created man, He created him with all the features that determine his 
actions, with the result that the doctrine of the creation of man by God cannot accord itself with 
the doctrine of human freedom, without which one cannot consider man as a being who is 
morally responsible
83
. The doctrine of creation does not accord with the facts of life. How 
could one accept that the world is the work of an infinitely good and wise being, if one sees that 
life is but necessity and anguish, suffering and burden
84
? Life does not bring happiness, it only 
brings suffering. It is therefore a fundamental mistake to think that happiness is the goal of 
life
85
. If life is tragic, this means that suffering is a process of purification. Death is the only 
goal of life, its only fruit
86
. Seen objectively, the conclusion imposes itself that “the game is not 
worth the candle”87. And still, each human being keeps and defends his life as if it had infinite 
value; each one loves his life above all else, and fears death more than any other danger. This 
opposition between the misery of life and the love of life can only be explained by supposing 
that life is the manifestation of a blind will that acts as the instinct of life
88
. The principle of life 
is the will that tries to give itself an objective form through its different manifestations in 
nature
89
. As the principle of life, the will is also the principle of knowledge
90
. Within the 
framework of modern paradigmatic philosophy affirming the will as the principle of reality is 
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 Cf Verneaux, p.22. 
83
 Schopenhauer IV, Parerga , p.153: « Handelt es nun schlecht ; so kommt dies daher, dass es schlecht ist, und 
dann ist die Schuld nicht seine, sondern dessen, der es gemacht hat. » 
84
 Schopenhauer IV, Parerga, p.151 : « ...die Last des Lebens selbst und sein Hineilen zum bitteren Tode 
ehrlicherweise nicht damit zu vereinigen, dass sie das Werk vereinter Allgüte, Allweisheit und Allmacht sein 
sollte. » 
85
 Schopenhauer, II, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, II, p. 813 : »Es gibt nur einen angeborenen Irrtum, und es 
ist der, dass wir dasind, um glücklich zu sein. » 
86
 Schopenhauer, ibid, p. 817 : »Das Sterben is allerdings als der eigentliche Zweck des Lebens anzusehen. » 
87
 Schopenhauer, ibid, p. 463 : »le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle » 
88
 Schopenhauer, ibid, p. 464 : « ...blinde Wille, auftretend als Lebenstrieb, Lebenslust, Lebensmut » 
89
 Schopenhauer, ibid, pp.411-423, Kapitel 25, Transzendente Betrachtungen über den Willen als Ding an sich. 
90
 Schopenhauer, ibid, p. 466 
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the ultimate consequence of paradigmatic thinking. The aim of paradigmatic thought is not 
understanding reality but it’s realisation91.  
 
With Nietzsche Schopenhauer’s will becomes Will to Power, and his pessimism 
becomes nihilism without God. The starting point of his thought is the negation of God’s 
existence. Christianity and the belief in God are disappearing for in our time there is no God
92
. 
God is dead and we put Him to death. In The Gay Science he writes: 
The Madman. – Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright 
morning, ran to the market and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God!” As there were 
many of those who do not believe in God, he provoked a great laughter. Why did he get lost 
then? said one. Did he lose his way as a child? Said another. Or is he hiding himself? Is he 
afraid of us? Did he take the boat? Did he emigrate? – they thus yelled and laughed. The 
madman jumped in their midst and pierced them with his glances. “Whither is God go to? he 
shouted. I shall tell you! We killed him –you and I! We all are his murderers!93 
“We” in Nietzche’s parable are the people on the market, a place that stands for the 
expression of the morals and customs of a civilisation. Nietzsche says therefore our civilisation 
killed God. Heidegger, whose interpretation of Nietzsche is particularly profound, asks if 
Nietzsche does not formulate what occidental metaphysical history has always implicitly said 
already
94
. God is dead because the belief in God is no longer an effective power in the daily life 
of Occidental civilisation. The dead of God in the thought of Nietzsche means the loss, or more 
precisely, the absence of belief in God. But the absence of the belief in God means more than 
the negation of God. It also means that the earth is loosened from its sun, and that the entire 
horizon is wiped away. That horizon is the eternal values. The dead of God brings with it the 
extinction of the absolute and eternal values
95
. The consequence of the dead of God is the most 
absolute relativism, the relativism that is a “continuous falling”, where there is neither top nor 
bottom. There is no longer being, but only becoming, outside of which there is nothing; and 
                                                 
91
 Russel and Scheler mention the domination of the world. Cf Russell, p. 270, Scheler, p.92 
92
 Nietzsche, II, p.1199 « Auch der Priester weiss, ... dass es keinen « Gott » mehr , gibt ... » 
93
 Nietzsche II,p.127 : « Ich suche Gott ! Ich suche Gott. » - Da dort gerade viel von denen zusammenstanden, 
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94
 Heidegger, p Holzwege, « Nietzsches Wort « Gott is tot » p. 196. This is true for paradigmatic philosophy, not 
for noëtic thought 
95
 Ibid. p.200. 
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becoming does not have a goal, an end; it has no value
96
. With the dead of God nihilism, the 
most terrible guest, knocks at the door
97
. Nihilism is the penetrating feeling of nothingness
98
, 
the radical refusal of all value and meaning in existence
99
, following the negation of all being, 
of all that is divine
100
. Nihilism is living life as an absurdity and the most extreme form of 
nihilism is to affirm the eternity of nothingness, of absurdity
101
.  
 
For Nietzsche the death of God signifies that the human race as we know it has to be 
replaced. In order to survive from the death of God, man has to change radically. The death of 
God inaugurates the coming of an impious humanity, living without God
102
. 
 
“God is dead: now the Uebermensch must come” says Zarathustra103. The principle of 
this transformation of man into übermensch is to be found in life itself. Since the death of God 
implies the negation of all transcendent values, the principle must be strictly inherent in life 
itself. Life has to be a constant surpassing of itself
104
. Immanence becomes the principle of this 
surpassing. This principle, Nietzsche calls it the will to power. The will to power is the will that 
“generates life inexhaustibly”105.  
 
Nietzsche draws the ultimate consequences of a strictly paradigmatic world that 
excludes any reference to noëtic thought . It is animated by the will to power, finds its 
expression in technical mastery of the world (art), its truth becomes a project of reality
106
, and it 
is strictly atheist. 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, William James (1842-1910), following Pierce (1839-
1914)
107
, places his thought firmly in the paradigmatic tradition. His thesis is: 
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 Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht, Aph. 617 (Werke III, 884). 
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 Nietzsche Werke III, p. 881. 
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 Nietzsche Wille zur Macht 1020, Werke, p. 661. 
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 Nietzsche Werke III, p.881. 
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 Nietzsche, Werke II, 523. 
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 Nietzsche Werke II, p.370. 
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 Nietzsche Werke III, p.919 : « Das Kriterium der Wahrheit liegt in der Steigerung des Machgefühls », Cf also 
III, 888, III, 76. 
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The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It 
becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process 
namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication.
108
 
For James philosophy is essentially a proposition of models of action
109
. In a very 
paradigmatic manner, truth, for James is what works
110
. The American Pragmatic school, in 
particular Dewey, took up this definition of meaning
111
 
 
Notwithstanding his beginning in the “things” (Sachen) and his “turn to the object”112 
Husserl’s (1859-1938) Phenomenology is typically a paradigmatic school of thought. The 
phenomenological reduction, the epoché, pared with the transcendental reduction places 
phenomenology without any doubt in the paradigmatic camp: 
“The real transcendental Epoché renders possible the “transcendental reduction”-the 
discovery and investigation of the transcendental correlation of world and world awareness”113 
 
Under the existentialists, Sartre (1905-1980) is typically a paradigmatic existentialist, 
Expressions such as “Man is nothing else than what he makes of himself This is the first 
principle of existentialism” and “Man is first of all a project” 114places Sartre clearly in the 
camp of paradigmatic thinking. 
 
The five ‘limit situations’ of Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) represent an adaptation of the 
five transcendentals of medieval thought (res, unum, bonum, verum, aliquid) to human 
existence. Death is the limit of res, suffering, which pulls asunder, is the limit of unum, conflict 
the limit of bonum, culpability the limit of verum, being-in-situation the limit of aliquid. In as 
much as these transcendentals are based on the five causes of Aristotelian thought, and are thus 
in the noëtic tradition, one could conclude that the existentialism of Jaspers belongs to this 
tradition. Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) is definitely a noëtic existentialist.115 His insistence 
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on the revelation of being and transcendence puts him in the school of noëtic thought
116
. And 
his definition of truth as being revelation (Аληθείά) confirms this. 
 
In experimental science there is a reaction too. More and more the paradigmatic nature 
of modern science leads to questioning the truth of scientific statements. Popper (1902 – 1994) 
already remarked that science can never pretend to be true if it proceeds by affirmative 
sentences; only refutations are scientifically certain
117
. Thomas Kuhn (1922 - 1996) adds to this 
analysis the importance of the paradigm and the paradigm shift, and Feyerabend (1924 – 1994) 
adds the importance of creativity in scientific research
118
.  
 
This short outline of the noëtic and paradigmatic philosophic traditions brings to the 
fore the question of their relation. Until the collapse of the communist world, the two traditions 
followed separate paths. But with the fiasco of establishing a paradigmatic society, a “Brave 
New World”, the question of the relation between those two traditions becomes important. 
Since noëtic thought has as its truth the correspondence of thought to reality, it can understand 
paradigmatic thought, whereas paradigmatic thought cannot understand noëtic thought, but can 
only propose models of noëtic thought, which is in itself already a betrayal of noëtic thought. A 
purely paradigmatic world makes of man a material, a function, of the social model, whereas a 
purely noëtic world, while recognising the importance of the human person, remains without 
any change as such; it is a static world. We need both traditions to give the human person the 
dignity it should have and at the same time the changes it aspires to for a better world. 
 
Another point that is remarkable in this outline of the history of philosophy is the 
predominance of paradigmatic ways of thinking in modern philosophy. This is to be expected, 
for paradigmatic thought is grounded on creativity, and man, even in the framework of noëtic 
thought, is a creative existence. What is needed is the restraining force of noëtic thought to 
bring back consciousness to the elementary truths of existence and society. This we will try to 
outline in the following chapters. 
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 PARADIGMATIC AND NOËTIC SOCIETY 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Noë
.
tic social theory 
The emergence of truth consciousness within society and about society would seem to be a 
privileged field of application of both noëtic and paradigmatic truth. Human society is a human 
reality which is neither entirely determined nor entirely artificial. Although man is social by 
nature, how he determines social roles, institutions and organisation is largely determined by his 
own realisations, and such realisations are determined by models of social behaviour and 
planning. Here paradigmatic truth evidently plays a preponderant role, enabling man in a large 
degree to shape society as he sees fit. How society organises and maintains itself politically, 
economically and socially depends on paradigmatic truth and its models. In particular all social 
change, necessarily, implies paradigmatic truth. Finally, however, such realisations and changes 
within society presuppose implicitly or explicitly a conception about society as such. Living and 
acting within society man becomes conscious about society. At this level of inquiry, we find two 
traditions within western thought: a noëtic and a paradigmatic one. 
The noëtic tradition considers society as a reality having a structure determined by the 
nature of society. This does not preclude man's freedom of social realisations and action, but it 
does set a definite framework which man can only deny or transgress at the risk of perverting and 
eventually destroying the social body. 
A noëtic analysis of society encounters a first difficulty in that we do not have a direct 
experience of society. There seems to be two reasons for this state of affairs. First, society is not a 
substantial entity that one can encounter. A thing, a person, even a theory can be the object of 
direct experience, but one cannot say that one has met with society. Popper, in a similar way, 
rejects social wholes as empirical objects of study: "These so-called social wholes are very largely 
postulates of popular social theories rather than empirical objects."
119 
The second, closely related, 
reason is that we are always already in society; we enter society not from without, but from 
within. Society encompasses us, with the result that our encounters with society are always 
partial. As a matter of fact we experience society through the exchange with our fellow citizens, 
through work, through our engagement in public activities, through the use we make of its 
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services, through the constraints it puts on us, through our dealings with its institutions and their 
servants. But society is none of these; it is more. Nor could one identify society with the state. 
The state may determine the political, even the social and economic organisation of society, but it 
is not society itself. Encompassing man and his public activities, one can infer that society is a 
whole, a totality. But of what is it a whole? It is certainly not the totality of its members. A 
conglomeration of people does not as such constitute a society. On the other hand, without 
people, society does not exist. The people are at least its condition sine qua non, if not its cause. 
Man is a social being. In order to determine the nature of society, it would seem important to 
determine what the social nature of man signifies. 
Man is, however, not only a social being, he is also an individual. This individuality 
belongs to common experience. I am not the person to whom I speak. Not only that I have my 
own character, but I am strictly individual in my existence itself, and that is why I cannot live 
another's existence, nor die his death. As Heidegger notes, existence is "jemeinig"
120
.The 
individuality of man's existence implies an ontological autonomy. Having his own existence, man, 
at least grown up man, is not in his existence dependant upon another. He is a substantial being in 
the sense of a being which has its own immanent principle of existence “Substantia individua et 
incommunicabile".
121
 The substantiality of human existence is the ultimate ontological ground of 
man's individuation, individuality, and independence. In his very existence man cannot be 
reduced to a relation. 
If substance qua immanent principle of being accounts for the human individuality and 
autonomy at all levels of existence, it does not account for man's sociability. Sociability depends 
on sharing, on what is one way or another common. What is common to man in the first place is 
his human nature. This is what predisposes man to human communication, which is principally 
different from any animal communication
122
. As Miller points out, to communicate on the level of 
human language does not depend on the size of the brain but on "being human"
123
. And, human 
communication is at the root of all social communication
124
. Society is 
“A group of people with a common and at least somewhat distinct CULTURE who 
occupy a particular territorial area, have a feeling of unity, and regard themselves as a 
distinguishable entity. Like all groups, a society has a structure of elated roles..”125 
As a network of communications, society has a certain unity and structure. Society is a 
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whole of human relations.
126  
As a relation society exists at the ontological level of an accident, and as a totality of such 
relations it is a predicamental accident
127
. Society is not a substance, and this implies from a 
purely ontological point of view that man exists at a higher level than society. And from the point 
of view of nature man is also never only a member or a part of society. By his reason he can 
abstract himself from the historical context; he can rise above society in thought viewing it as it 
were from the outside. What Thomas of Aquinas maintains about the person with relation to 
nature applies also to the human person in his relationship with society: "Persona significat id 
quod est perfectissimum in tota natura."
128
 
This does not mean, however, that society represents an accident of which man can 
dispose at will. It is a necessary accident; for two reasons. Man's nature disposes him to social 
life. As Aristotle noted, man is not only a political, but also a social being
129
. Man's very reason 
makes social intercourse an existential necessity. Secondly society itself has its raison d'être in the 
aims it pursues. There are two reasons for people getting and living together: love and 
collaboration. 'Love' is used in this context as a theoretical term connoting the act of being 
attracted by an object or a person, i.e. by an end. Both modalities of love play a role in social life. 
The market place is the occasion where love of objects manifests itself clearly. Interpersonal love 
on the other hand manifests itself in social gathering and particularly in marriage and the family. 
Collaboration seeks by action and production to realise a common goal. At the level of survival 
the common good is assured by the independence and continuity of the society. Human society 
shares this striving for survival with animal societies. What distinguishes it from animal society is 
the search for the good life, as Aristotle terms it
130
. The common good includes spiritual goods 
proper to man, such as education, culture, science, philosophy, morality, religion. 
The common good differs from the personal good by its quantitative aspect. It is a good 
which the individual alone cannot attain and which can be distributed amongst many according to 
the norms of distributive justice. It constitutes the dimension within which and through which the 
person can realise his own meaning of existence. The common good serves the individual as well 
as the community. Being a good that the individual cannot attain in isolation, or only with great 
difficulty, it exercises certain demands. Its accomplishment supposes the collaboration of the 
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members of the community, and to this degree, it demands that the citizen subjects himself to its 
exigencies. Nevertheless, this claim cannot degenerate into a demand to abnegation. Society being 
accidental in comparison with the substantial being of its members, the common good is in final 
analysis subservient to the individual. Although it is not a means, being the aim of co-operation, it 
is nevertheless a limited good that cannot replace the individual end. Personal happiness is 
comprised in the common good as a possibility, not as a necessity. As Popper remarks, "happiness 
is private and its attainment should be left to private endeavour."
131
 
 
Paradigmatic Social Theory  
Although the conception of a paradigmatic society may outwardly resemble noëtic theory, 
still its structure is radically different. Existing reality is not the principle of analysis, but the 
occasion that permits the construction of an ideal society. In this sense paradigmatic social 
thought has revolutionary tendencies. In trying to accord social reality to its ideal standards, it 
may radically transform the community, destroying the past and the present in order to make way 
for the future. This is one of the reasons why Popper relates utopia to violence
132
. 
The model itself or blueprint of the ideal society is the absolute norm of action. An action 
is true, paradigmatically, in conforming to, or leading towards the model or one of its aspects. 
Such models being a priori and axiomatic, the corresponding society will be conventional, 
in the sense that it is the exclusive result of subjective ideals translated into social action. 
Evidently such dreams have their limits, since all are not realisable. But this does not alter the fact 
that utopia is imposed on society. 
This leads to the second characteristic of paradigmatic societal models. Qua global models 
they are systems of society. Noëtic society needs a certain organisation and discipline in order to 
function smoothly. A priori models, however, develop their own rules of operation; instead of a 
corresponding theory of truth they adopt a coherence theory of truth, coherence being a minimal 
criterion for the realization of the model. Such coherence imposed on social reality necessarily 
renders society systematic. The model regulates all phases of social life. Society is the matter 
whose raison d'être is the realisation and maintenance of the systematic model. In this sense 
paradigmatic societies, notwithstanding their capacity for historical change, are closed societies 
with strictly determined functions at all levels in all fields of social action. The common good on 
.the other hand is not subjective, a blue-print, but grows out of society in its historical situation. 
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And submitting itself to the quest of happiness of persons or groups of persons within society, it 
cannot lead to a systematisation of society. 
A third characteristic of paradigmatic social models is that they need verification. They 
need to be realized in society, if they are not to remain vain dreams. Society thus becomes the 
matter of realisation of the ideal model. The entire society is mobilised for this purpose. And as 
different models are possible, each trying to impose itself, a paradigmatic world is a world of 
endless ideological struggles, as Heidegger has pointed out
133
. In this mobilization of all forces in 
view of the functioning of the system, man plays an important rôle. Man being the most important 
element of society, man is necessarily regarded in terms of matter and function. Man becomes 
worker, and his work is nothing less than the realisation of the system. On the other hand, being 
matter, man is also transformable. He is regarded as a series of processes which can be controlled, 
corrected, changed according to the system itself. Paradigmatic society inaugurates the era of the 
endless manipulation of man by man. However ideal and attractive the society in question may 
be, its members cannot be other than its paid day-labourers. As Popper puts it: "However 
benevolent its ends, it [utopian rationalism] does not bring happiness, but only the familiar misery 
of being condemned to live under a tyrannical government."
134
 
On the other hand, society itself having the function of realising the ideal model, the 
paradigmatic view of society is typically historistical. Qua transformable matter, society as well 
as reality as a whole is interpreted in terms of becoming, evolution towards the ideal within the 
history of humankind. 
In comparing noëtic and paradigmatic social theory, the following differences stand out. 
Paradigmatic society is, in principle, revolutionary, whereas noëtic society does not reject history 
but sees it as a condition on which the present can build further. The ultimate norm of 
paradigmatic society is the ideal system, the end of noëtic society is the common good. 
Paradigmatic society is a closed society, whereas noëtic society is an open society that does not 
mortgage its future by a fixed blueprint. Finally, the citizens of a noëtic society are regarded as 
substantial rational individual persons, the common good ultimately serving man’s personal 
development and happiness. Paradigmatic theory reverses the relation between man and society: 
society is the substance – in the Spinozist meaning of the term135 -, man, qua social relation, is 
accident. One sees the difference quite clearly with clubs of sport. There are clubs that sacrifice its 
members to attaining sportive achievements, and there are other clubs who try to obtain results 
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while respecting the personal existence of its members. 
  
 
Ernst Bloch's Utopia  
The philosophy of Ernst Bloch is an eminent example of a paradigmatic conception of 
society, Bloch sees the present as the stepping stone towards an ideal future
136
. Man is an utopian 
being characterized by hope. His dreams represent a vision of the future expressed 
psychologically as desire, morally as ideal, aesthetically as symbol. Philosophy stands or falls 
with its ability to translate such dreams into knowledge of a realisable future
137
. With Marx, 
Bloch maintains that the immanent telos of history is the humanisation of nature and the 
’naturalisation’ of man. The immanent telos of social history takes the form of a classless 
society
138
. 
The realisation of a classless society implies freedom and order. Freedom for Bloch is the 
will of the collectivity towards a classless society. When freedom realises this goal, it becomes 
the kingdom of freedom, which does not exclude necessity but rather mediates concretely with it. 
Alluding to Hegel's description of freedom in terms of a medieval cathedral, Bloch points out that 
the roads leading towards this kingdom are not necessarily liberal: "they are the conquest of 
power within the state, they are discipline, authority, central planning a general line of conduct, 
orthodoxy.”139 Thus social freedom maintains a dialectical relation with order which is the 
necessity arising out of the classless society itself. Freedom ends in order, and order is 
"democratic centralism, it is the common organisation of the process of production, the common 
and uniform planning of human information and cultivation."
140 
For Bloch this represents "a new 
order of salvation, namely for the human material." 
141
 
The fourth most important part of Bloch's Das Prinzip Hoffnung, is entitled 
"Construction". Bloch's utopian thought is paradigmatic in structure and intention. 
Philosophy is essentially the activity of conceiving an ideal world based on man's dreams 
and the tendency-latency of the processes of reality. Reality is understood exclusively in terms of 
possibilities and processes without any inherent determination. The ideal itself - classless society - 
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as a realisable possibility and immanent telos of history represents an absolute norm for Bloch
142
. 
Finally, important features of the future society are interpreted in terms of paradigmatic 
categories. Freedom does not in the first place constitute a dimension of the human person but 
belongs to the collectivity, and ends in the system itself of the classless society. In the same way 
interpersonal relationships, especially friendship, are interpreted paradigmatically in terms of the 
intersubjective relations within a group working towards a common goal. Friendship is 
understood as fraternity reigning within the process of production
143
. 
Man himself is understood in terms of possibilities and as a function of the classless 
society
144
, a material. 
I have insisted somewhat on Bloch's social theory, because paradigmatic utopian thought 
is rooted in a rich tradition of modern thought. Descartes already in the second part of the 
Discours on Method gives directions for the construction of a new and perfect society. Leibniz 
speaks of the kingdom of infinite possibilities
145
. Fichte's Handelsstaat represents an "experiment 
for a future policy aiming at socialistic well-being through man's own work." Modern idealism, 
especially as represented in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, is paradigmatic in structure. And 
since the norm of paradigmatic thought is its concrete realisation, the paradigmatic tradition of 
modern thought can be expected to have had and still to have an important influence on society. 
Marx's well-known dictum that philosophy until now has contemplated, but that the time has 
come to act, reflects the historical development of Occidental civilisation. Western society has 
become largely a paradigmatic society. 
 
Human Society 
The increasing influence of paradigmatic thought and realisations constitute the crisis of 
Occidental society. For Heidegger it represents the ultimate danger for man - the danger of 
dangers
146
. Popper also speaks of the "mortal danger into which mankind has floundered - no 
doubt the gravest danger in history-"
147
 
Time is not reversible, and neither is history in its great outlines. Nor can we escape the 
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present danger by the construction of a thoroughly technical society as Marcuse proposes
148
; this 
only accentuates the paradigmatic dangers of society. Western society finds itself in the grips of a 
fearful dilemma: it can neither reject nor accept the paradigmatic features that threaten the human 
existence of man. 
Nevertheless it seems to me that a partial synthesis between noëtic and paradigmatic 
thought is possible. Since noëtic thought can account for paradigmatic thought in terms of limited 
enterprises within the framework of a noëtic understanding of the nature of society, whereas the 
paradigmatic tradition because of its a priori axiomatic excludes any noëtic considerations, I 
would personally argue for a noëtic conception of society according to the principle that the more 
inclusive theory which by 
 
way of incorporation or synthesis can account for other theories is 
epistemologically the stronger. 
A synthesis of noëtic and paradigmatic social thought requires in the first place that 
paradigmatic thought abandons its claims of exclusiveness and operates within the larger 
framework of a noëtic understanding. The common good thus defined noëtically is not an ideal 
arising out of human subjectivity, but a principle setting in each case concrete goals. Such goals 
will be active on two fronts: first the struggle against existing misery in all its forms, then the 
discovery of goals which in each case further society and man. Such goals are geared to defend 
the rights and interests of personal and minority groups as well as of society as such, leaving the 
maximum of freedom to each person or group of persons. In this sense noëtic social thought is 
invested with the decision of the long-and short-term aims to be realised on the basis of a noëtic 
understanding of society, its constituent groups and activities, bearing particularly in mind man's 
privileged status within society. 
Within this framework the role of paradigmatic thought acquires human dimensions 
without loosing its importance. Paradigmatic thought in close co-operation with the social 
sciences can develop adequate models as ways of attaining the chosen aims by the proposal and 
organisation of limited systems
149
. 0nly on this basis can it work towards a human society 
furthering the development of all the dimensions of the human person. 
Having analysed the implications of noëtic and paradigmatic thought applied to society, 
we shall in the following chapter analyse the application of those two modes of thought to 
individual existence through an analysis of love, as an example of individual concern. 
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 NOËTIC AND PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS OF LOVE 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Love
150
 is an important dimension of human existence. As the Oxford dictionary 
indicates we can love little children, learning, adventure, one’s country, a story, one’s parents, 
one’s husband. The theologian would add that we love God, the just that we love justice, and 
the philosopher wisdom. Nothing in life seems to escape our love. One loves or does not love 
things as well as beings, oneself as well as others. Despite this diversity that makes love one of 
the richest conditions of our existence, the analysis of these situations shows that love has a 
structure that remains constant, and that defines it. 
 
The structure of love : 1. The object of love 
Love has an object. By 'object' we mean what is loved, whether a thing, a being or an 
event. The object can be as abstract as the truth, it may be an activity, but in all such cases love 
is not without its object. We do not love as such, we always love something. Through the love 
of objects and beings that inhabit our world we are attracted to the world itself. Every moment 
of love is an existential event that throws us into the world, taking on an ecstatic character. 
Love is opposed to intelligence in the sense that by the intelligence one in a certain manner 
assimilates the world. By thought, I can think of realities far removed from me, the 
astronomical universe, for example, and I place myself in the centre of this world I think about. 
Just as the theory of relativity states that each observer observes the universe from a point 
which seems for him to be the centre of the universe, in a similar way our thought places us in 
the centre of our universe of thought. Love on the other hand, draws us out into the world 
around us. If thought is centripetal, love is centrifugal.  
Love connects us to the world. It establishes a real relationship. Any relationship 
involves a subject, a term, and a foundation. The subject is that in which the relationship is, the 
term is that to which the relation tends, and the foundation is the cause of the relationship. The 
subject and the term are also called 'extremes'. Thus for the relation 'Genevieve is Paul's 
mother”, Genevieve is the subject, and Paul is the term. Given that a relationship requires at 
least two extremes, its cause is always complex. That is why we don’t talk of a cause, but a 
foundation. In this example, the foundation is not only Genevieve’s ability to have a son, but 
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also Paul's ability to be son of... Without one or the other, the relationship could not exist, with 
the result that it requires the co-operation of its extremes. Based on this analysis, we can 
distinguish logical relations from real relationships. Logical relations have as extremes 
concepts or data from the mind and their foundation is the comparison between these data in 
thought. When we say: "The concept 'house' is analogous to the concept 'home', we establish a 
logical relationship between the two concepts. On the other hand, real relations have their 
foundation in a capacity that really exists in the extremes. Genevieve has really, not only in 
thought, the capacity of motherhood, and Paul was actually conceived by her. Similarly, we 
maintain that love represents a real relation whose subject is the lover, the term the beloved, 
and the foundation a co-operation between the ability to love of the lover and the final causality 
of the beloved. Love is not just a concept or a subjective feeling in our mind, it really 
exists. One can then understand this relationship in two ways. Either it is the object that causes 
the attraction by his love, or love should be considered a spontaneous force that needs an object 
of satisfaction. If love takes its point of departure in the self, love is like hunger that is satisfied 
by any food. It is a spontaneous surge, a drive, libido. The object is the occasion, the condition 
of love, not that to which love tends and all love is, somehow, self-centred. In support of this 
theory of love is the ability to love seems more developed in some than in others, and that 
people are more oriented towards love at certain times of life. But the experience of personal 
love seems to refute this interpretation. If love were a subjective impulse, it would be 
impersonal, only binding on a type or category, which is indeed most often the case with the 
love of things. But in the realm of human relations, experience suggests that love is caused by 
the beloved. Why do we love one person rather than another, if not because the beloved invites 
love? It can therefore be argued that the object is the foundation of love. As a cause of love, 
something impersonal - seafood - causes an impersonal love, while a personal object – one’s 
friend - causes a personal love. Love gives us an opening to the world. 
Which of the two interpretations should we support? Love is it, like hunger, a need that 
finds in the beloved an object of satisfaction? Or is it a 'passio', a response to the attraction 
exerted on him by the object of love? We opt for the latter interpretation. Indeed, this 
interpretation by making love depending on its object, explains the personal love as well as 
impersonal love. While the first interpretation, which explains love in terms of a drive starting 
with the one who loves, cannot account for personal love. The interpretation that we support 
has the advantage of being simpler and more comprehensive because it can analyse love 
without having to introduce other evidence than the relationship between love and its 
object. Without denying the relational character of love, we therefore maintain that the object 
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of love is the foundation of love in the sense that it draws on our ability to love. The object 
focuses our capacity of loving. This object has two functions. First, the philosophical tradition 
names the subject of love the 'Good'. It does not mean the quality, moral or otherwise, as in the 
phrase "he is a good carpenter" or "do a good deed." The term refers to the very being that 
attracts. Through the outward appearance of things, love loves being itself. We love the person 
of the beloved, we love things for what they are. By the term 'good' we mean therefore the 
being of a reality, whether it be an event, an activity, a thing or a person capable of being 
loved.
151
  
G.E.Moore in his “Principia Ethica” maintains that the good thus understood cannot be 
defined:  
“If I am asked “What is good?” my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of 
the matter.”152  
Indeed, a definition of good by genus and specific difference would put the good in a 
class of properties or objects that presuppose a larger class of properties or objects, a genus. But 
good is a transcendental and is as such convertible with being
153
. As such it is also 
analogous
154
, which makes of love as we understand it an analogous happening. Other is the 
love for learning and the love for one’s friends and members of the family, but still there is a 
core – being attracted – which remains. 
The second function of the love object, closely related to the first, is its capacity to 
attract. This means that the good has a final causality. The good attracts love, it radiates around 
itself a field that leads to love. While the term 'good' means the very being of what is loved, 
final causality designates the activity exercised by the good  
 
2. The meeting of love. 
The good, however, does not cause love in an automatic manner, since different people 
may react differently to the same good. The dog that barks means for one fear for another joy. 
One likes what somebody else has. In order that love may happen two conditions must be met. 
First, it is necessary that a meeting be possible in time and space. One cannot love what one 
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does not meet. The meeting may take different forms, it can be topological or purely spiritual, 
and it may be a pure coincidence, but without it love is not possible. Next, it is necessary that 
this meeting presents favourable characteristics capable of engendering love, as any meeting 
does not necessarily lead to love. In order to love a good it must be noticed and its attraction 
must answer a call in us. We must be sensitive to the attraction the good in question exercises 
on us. Scholastic philosophy was talking in this context about a similarity 
155
. However, it is not 
a similarity in the sense of likeness. To avoid confusion, we use the term 'encounter of love' 
instead of the term 'similarity'. The relationship between a good and the lover is not necessarily 
a similarity in the psychological sense. Complementarity as well as sympathy may give birth to 
love. Often opposites attract each other. It is rather a predisposition determined by 
psychological, social, and historical conditioning that enables us to be sensitive to the attraction 
of the good in question. Thus the emotional field conditions the profound orientation of our 
emotional life, becoming clearer through our emotional experiences. The accumulation of these 
experiences, as part of the emotional sensitivity of the individual, represents the condition of 
love without which the attraction of the good remains ineffective. 
The encounter of love can be compared to two fields - one created by the final causality 
of the good and the other by the emotional field of the lover - that fit together. Through it the 
person establishes an emotional communication with his good. Do we not say that "the current 
passes" that one is "on the same wavelength," that we have "a lot in common with somebody”? 
 
The love relationship 
Love is born of this encounter between the final causality and the emotional field, 
between the person and his good. The good specifically draws towards itself, it ‘informs’ a 
person. This information takes the form of a formal presence, not physical, which implies that 
the person tends to the good he, or she, encountered. One carries in one’s heart the beloved. If 
one compares this with the presence of concepts in our intelligence, we note that these 
represent only the perceived reality, while the emotional presence has a specific nature: it tends 
towards the beloved. 'The information of the good’, operates an inclination by which the 
beloved is present while drawing the lover all the while to the beloved good. This is what St. 
Augustine called the "weight of the soul", the movement that leads the soul according to its 
natural tendencies to its own place
156
. The good plays therefore a dual role in relation to 
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emotional life: on the one hand it directs affections by individual specifications to itself, on the 
other hand it causes the same condition by its, non physical attraction. It is this second function 
which is the proper role of the good; specification only represents a special case of the whole 
order of apprehension, because our intelligence is also specified by things, but in a different 
way. This attraction appears therefore as an ecstatic presence, source of joy and suffering that 
wakes us up emotionally and projects us into the world. Incorporating affections that answer 
the specification-attraction of the good by which the good becomes present as a beloved good 
and becomes an object of love, this first moment is love itself: presence, emotional inclination 
in the heart of the lover, constituting the first response of man to the good. This definition of 
love is a poor representation of a richness and intensity that touches the depths of man, fills his 
life, and is behind everything he does, thinks and feels. As a matter of fact, it is not even a 
proper definition. Love is one of the mysteries of human existence and like any mystery our 
mind can not grasp it from the outside
157
. Even if we succeed in determining the cause, 
conditions, consequences of love, the very reality of love cannot be grasped entirely by our 
intelligence and appears to us only in the very act of loving. It would be wrong to fathom the 
mystery of love, because love does not need our understanding. Love is a natural act that we 
may stimulate, encourage, direct, but still remains spontaneous. Although our study does seek 
to understand everything about love - its condition, its cause, effect, its terms - it does not 
intend to dissect love itself. Instead, it seeks to give it all its spontaneity through an awareness, 
a better understanding of the forces acting on it, stimulating or hampering it. 
 
Desire. 
The inclination towards the good leads to a concrete movement towards the object of 
love. If it is absent, love takes the form of an impulse toward the object and appropriate action 
that tries to straddle the physical and spiritual distance that separates us. This is a form of love 
that adds to love the movement towards the absent good. Because desire comes from the 
absence of the beloved, it introduces into the emotional life of love the concrete and effective 
action. Aristotle speaks of "desire, which imparts the movement"
158
. One should therefore not 
confuse the inclination of love to the good with the movement of desire. One is a presence-
attraction that has as an object and cause the good, the other presupposes love and manifests 
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itself as an impetus that has as an aim the presence of the good, union with it and ceases when 
the union is accomplished. We want to make a trip, but in the moment that we do it, we can no 
longer desire it. We want to own a piece of art, and when we have it, we can no longer desire it. 
One can, on the other hand, love it. Since the desire ceases when the union with the good is 
made, it brings to love a certain temporality. Franz Brentano notes: "Phenomena that normally 
are meant by the word 'desire' (Wunsch) relate in part to the future, in part to the present, in part 
to the past. I want to see you often, I desire to be a rich man, I would not have done this; here 
are three examples that represent three times”159  
Indeed, if desire is the movement of love to an absent good, we can speak of a desire 
relating to the past, but we should add that it is a missing good, and thus a vain desire. This 
desire implies always a feeling of regret, helplessness. The desire that refers to the present has a 
note of impatience and is mainly the work of libido. While the desire that turns towards the 
future is characterised by hope. But in all three situations desire always involves the experience 
of a lack, of a good that we should like to be present, but that is not in fact. What matters is that 
the desire introduces into love movement, succession, and hence temporality. And since the 
movement carries with it only the hope of the good with no guarantee of actually achieving it, 
desire can also endanger love, either by ceasing before the goal is attained by emotional 
exhaustion or by reaching another good, substituting another good. On the other hand, the 
realisation or moving to ... may imply that one has to overcome certain obstacles. Desire can 
then give way to anger, daring or even recklessness, what was once called the irascible 
passions. 
We see that desire and its moments are the natural consequence of the first attraction 
felt without which emotional life would often be trapped between the impassable walls of 
abortive and powerless ecstasy. For this reason this structural moment plays an important role 
as concerns emotional experience. If one can nurture a secret love, unknown to oneself even, 
man's desires, even if they are repressed are manifested in one way or the other, as shown by 
the psychoanalysis of Freud. But despite its psychological importance, it should be noted that 
all desire presupposes a love so that in order to understand desire one has to understand the 
love that is presupposed by it. If psychological and psychiatric analysis concentrates mainly on 
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desire - libido - in philosophy the emphasis is on love as the basis of desire and presupposed by 
it.
160
. 
The union of love 
 
The analysis of desire shows that the structure of love involves a third moment, where 
the trend towards.... ends in union with the beloved. Such a union of love can take many forms, 
from physical contact to the deepest spiritual communion, but it is always the effect of love. 
 
 This moment of union with the good one loves comes with pleasure, joy, enjoyment, 
happiness – the personal and subjective experience of this union that has become a reality. It is 
therefore important to distinguish between these two levels, that of the union itself and that of 
its subjective experience, which is a natural sign of that union. Geiger, writes about it: 
".... We are in the presence of two forms of the good, connected to each other as the sign 
and what it means. On the one hand a psychological level, delight, on the other hand the good 
itself which may be called objective, food, shelter, companion, etc.. The subjective good is the 
sign of an objective good, as the green light means the road is free "
161
  
 
As a sign, the experience of the union will have a special character according to the 
modality of this union; other is the pleasure felt during the acquisition of tangible property, 
other is the joy that we feel in the presence of a friend. But whatever the modality of this 
'fruitio' - as St. Augustine calls it so well – its perfection, that of being a sign of union with the 
good, confers its own attraction, as Geiger remarked; it can easily become the object of desire. 
Having experienced pleasure in the presence of a good, the pleasure itself may become the 
deliberate aim of our desires. 
Although the union with the good is the end of desire, it is not the absolute aim of love. 
It is the effect of love. The union thus plays a dual role in the economy of love. It is the aim of 
desire and the effect of love. Thus, engaged couples wish to live together at the same time that 
their marriage is the seal of their love. In addition, the union is also a meeting which can then 
renew the meeting of love, and in this manner conditions the life of love. 
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Especially in human relationships, the union plays a particularly important role; on it 
depends the future of a love relationship. The union can take many forms, from mere presence 
to the deepest existential communication and intimacy. But in the life of love, it will decide in 
large part the outcome of love. A union that renews the meeting of love gives new life to love, 
while a union which slips imperceptibly into indifference and routine deprives love of its vital 
element, of its food. The psychological literature recognises its importance by allocating to 
communication - within the couple, for example - all its attention. 
The love that is accomplished by reciprocal love between lovers creates from a 'you' and 
a 'me' a 'we' community. The lover is considered an alter ego, the lover who wants and is good 
for his lover. According to Schopenhauer: 
"True friendship presupposes a very intense, purely objective and entirely disinterested 
participation in the fate of the other, which in turn presupposes a genuine identification with the 
friend."
162
  
 Still, this identification of the one with the other with the result that we cannot speak of 
the one without thinking of the other does not cause the loss of identity. On the contrary, 
wanting the good and seeking the good of everyone within the community of 'us', reciprocal 
love maintains a very keen respect for the individuality of each and tends even to accentuate 
this individuality. Love respects the otherness of each one. This is the mystery of love that 
while welding the union stronger, it allows everyone to be fully himself.  
The union is the visible part of the iceberg of love, it gives love a temporal and spatial 
form. So it plays a significant role in social life and it tends to be governed by social or legal 
provisions. In this sense it is the proper object of social ethics. In the union love gives itself 
body and acquires a concrete form. Friends meet in a public place, a marriage is celebrated, a 
couple takes an apartment, a family is started. By the union love becomes part of social life, to 
the point where the union can become an institution, in the case of marriage for example. The 
union then becomes a legal entity. Thus the union by its visible aspect becomes subject to the 
mores and laws of society. 
Nevertheless, we must not identify any union with the union of love. Men unite for two 
main reasons: either for love or for collaboration in a common task. Any human society or 
human group is one of those two types. If one does not exclude the other in the sense that any 
collaboration can become a meeting of love and union of love that often includes collaboration, 
the two phenomena are in themselves specifically different. The union of collaboration has an 
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aim which is its raison d'être: the factory is to manufacture products, school is for education. 
The union of love on the other hand does not have an end, it is the effect of love. Love is not 
looking in the same direction, as is often maintained. Employees have their gaze fixed on the 
same goal. Lovers look each other in the eyes. This gaze is what characterises love, while not 
excluding the vision of a future together. 
We see the complex role of the union in the life of love. It is the goal of desire, and the 
consequence of love. It provokes an emotion (fruitio). It is a form of encounter and is the 
visible, concrete expression of love. 
 
Love compared to activities and conditions 
Until now we have reflected on the basic structure of love. The encounter is the 
condition of love, the good is the main final cause, while the union is the effect of love. To 
better situate love we shall look at other aspects of life which, without identifying with it, are 
often associated with it. 
 
Love and affectivity. 
The preliminary analysis of love at first allows to specify the concept of love by 
contrasting it with what is not. As the good causes love, evil arouses hatred, horror, aversion. 
Similarly, to desire corresponds negatively fear that causes flight from danger. Finally, joy is 
opposed to sadness, resulting from the invasion of evil in our existence. Even 'negative' 
emotional states have as their ultimate source love. We can only hate what we are concerned 
about, or what is related to our good. What is indifferent to us, cannot become an object of 
hatred. Similarly, one is afraid of what threatens to destroy the good we love, and anger seeks 
to destroy the evil that affects our good. We can only feel sadness if we love, as it is caused by 
the fact that a good we loved is torn away or is missing, either a beloved person, life, a certain 
idealism, an object. Thus hatred, fear, anger, sadness have as their first function the defence of 
the acquired good, whether this be an object, a person, a situation or even and especially one’s 
very existence, while love, desire, joy, have the function to expand in some sense the capital of 
the good. Since these trends of emotional repulsion are provoked indirectly by the good and 
since desire and joy relate to the good in a certain aspect - that of the absence and presence – it 
follows that love is the only response that directly relates to the good. Therefore, on the one 
hand love penetrates deeper than all other affections in our existence. On the other hand love 
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qua immediate response of all beings to the good of his world, is also the root source of all 
emotional life. As Maine de Biran said so aptly: 
 "Love, the source of all the emotional faculties, is life communicated to the soul ..."
163
  
Without love emotional life would not only be diminished, it would not exist. 
 
The feeling of love 
We have seen that love is a real relationship. But one also speaks often of the feeling of 
love. Love is it a feeling or a real relationship? In a relationship of love feelings change with 
time. Should we maintain that love changes when the feelings change, or should we say that it 
is the change in love that causes a change of feelings? And what when one is angry against 
one’s wife? Do we no longer love her temporarily, ready to love her again later? Is it not more 
realistic to say that we love her all the time, but that we are angry now, that the feeling of love 
has given way to a feeling of anger at the moment? 
These considerations and the analysis of the loving relationship brought us to come to 
understand love in terms of a real relationship, although unseen, of which the feeling of love is 
the sign. As smoke is the natural sign of fire, the feeling of love with its feelings of 
apprehension, hope, joy or even aggression are natural signs of love. Martin Buber makes of 
this conception the centre of his thoughts on love: 
"The feelings accompany the psychic and metaphysical fact of love, but they do not 
constitute love, and the accompanying feelings can be very different from each other .... 
Feelings live in people, but man lives in his love. This is not a metaphor, but reality: love is not 
inherent in the “I” in such a manner that it would have the “you” as a content' as an object; love 
is between you and me. "
164
  
According to this interpretation, it would be wrong to reduce love to a feeling. If love is 
reduced to feeling, one would have to conclude that love ceases when the feeling changes. 
Instead of representing a force of vitality, love becomes an emotional prison. Fearing to put 
into question love itself we dare not express the aggression which necessarily will occur in any 
intimate interpersonal relationship. We dare not develop in love, one clings to the first feelings. 
These initial feelings, especially sharp, mask subsequent feelings of love and take the form of a 
lost paradise that can no longer be salvaged and that will destroy imperceptibly the life of love 
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by preventing love to flourish. Obviously, one should not fall into the other extreme and see 
love as a kind of established fact which has nothing to do with feelings. 
 
Love and Sexuality 
The close connection between sexuality and love is evident and often leads to their 
identification. The Webster Dictionary gives as 7
th
 definition of love: “the sexual embrace: 
copulation.”165 This identification is propagated in the literature on love. Love in the 
publication of the collection "Que sais-je" uses the terms 'love' and 'sexuality' indifferently
166
.. 
It is true that one could draw parallels between love and sexuality. One might compare 
sexual gratification with self-love. The pansexualist could argue that no love is entirely free of 
sexual intentions. Especially we could see in sexual love the ultimate source of all search of 
communication with the outside world. Love would be a sublimation of an instinct more 
original. Attempts to discover such an ultimate source of vital communication are not lacking 
as a matter of fact. One thinks of Schopenhauer's will, the elan vital of Bergson, Nietzsche's 
will to power, or the will of Adler. 
As interesting as these monisms can be, our study is at a different level. It does not seek 
to establish the evolutionary origins of love, but from the phenomenon of love as can be seen, it 
seeks to understand its structure. 
Despite the undeniable interplay between sexuality and interpersonal love, our analysis 
shows, however, a difference of principle. Sexuality is a libidinal drive. It is an 'actio' while 
love we have seen, is a 'passio'. Sexuality is also a need that occurs even in the absence of any 
sexual object, while love has an object as its cause and depends on the encounter with the good. 
Similarly sexuality has a limited character unknown to love; sexual activity of a couple, even if 
you include fondling, occurs at certain times, this can not be said of love. Finally, as noted by 
Freud, the primary effect of sex is the reward, pleasure, and the union only if sexuality takes 
place within a relationship. 
One can love objects, such as learning, without any sexual implications or allusions. 
Moreover, the divisions within each are very different. Regarding sexuality, there are 
primarily two sexes, a distinction not found itself in the field of love. As we shall see, love 
makes no gender distinction in the first place, but is divided into love-of- means and love-of-
ends. The divisions that one can operate inside of a phenomenon depends on its internal 
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structure, if we cannot divide space and time in the same way it is because they both have a 
different structure. These considerations convince us that love and sexuality represent two 
different facets of human existence, each with its own specific structure. 
Distinguishing strictly sexuality and love, we do not deny the importance of sex for 
love. Although sexual differentiation is not a specific difference that makes man and woman 
two different natures, we are born male or female, and this difference undoubtedly plays a 
significant role in our loving relationships. The education in love plays an equally important 
role in the sexual attitudes and our existence as we grow up. If some seek sexual satisfaction 
outside the relationship of love, others will be unable to separate love and sex. However, the 
simultaneity of both phenomena and their reciprocal conditioning does not justify their 
identification. Instead, such confusion leads to a misunderstanding of love and sexuality. 
 
Love and art 
Finally we should mention that love is not an art. In his “The Art of Loving” Erich 
Fromm maintains that view, and in a manner entirely consistent then shows how to master the 
art of love through discipline, concentration, awareness of oneself, objectivity, faith in love, 
courage and productivity
167
. But art, strictly speaking, seeks to create a work separate from the 
artist himself by using certain techniques and a certain knowledge. And when the work is 
finished we cannot continue to apply the art in question. Thus, the statue is the result outside 
the sculptor and the statue is completed when the artist ceases to operate. Similarly, the 
physician practices the art of healing and when he has healed the patient he ceases treatment. 
Art is a transitive activity, and it leads to practical ends in a work separate from the activity 
itself. Love, on the other hand, is an immanent act. Even if through love we want to have 
children, or if one performs certain works by love, love as such is not a productive activity, an 
artistic creation. Love has its effects, but it does not create a work and it is not for a work. Love 
does not necessarily cease in the manner of a transitive activity. This does not mean necessarily 
that love lasts forever. Love, like everything that is human can die. To say that love is an 
immanent act means that when we love someone we can still love the same person.  
 We therefore cannot learn love as an art, though probably love implies a certain 
education. There are no rules, techniques or courses that might teach us to love, and there are 
no love diplomas. 
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This does not imply that we should take a fatalistic attitude towards love. In this sense, 
Fromm's book deserves to be studied. Indeed we can, through appropriate education and 
understanding of love, stimulate the willingness to love and free the spontaneity of love. A 
better understanding of the conditions and life of love can help us better to live love, solve 
problems, and eliminate certain prejudices. 
 
The types and forms of love 
 
As we have seen, the life of love takes place between the two poles of the good and its 
condition, the meeting. Any modification of one or other of these two poles leads inevitably to 
variations of love itself. Especially variations in the good determine the species of love. The 
analysis of the different types of the good forms the basis of the types of love. 
 
Love of ends, love of means. 
 
The object of love, the good, we have seen, has a final causality. Certain ends, however, 
involve means. To take an example from Aristotle
168
, one must use a flute as a means, if one 
wants to play the flute. The means, as well as the purposes are genuine goods which have a real 
attraction, a final causality. The flutist is actually attracted to a particular flute. But he is 
attracted to it since he likes to play the flute. The flute is a good for him and has a final 
causality because he loves to play. Therefore, means are real goods, while presupposing an end. 
They do not attract autonomously, but only in relation with another good. Any perceived 
attraction can cause love, with the result that we should talk of a real love for goods that are 
means for an end. The flutist really loves his instrument, which is also shown by the care with 
which he surrounds it. 
Despite the considerable difference in the emotional life between love for ends and love 
for means, both have the same structure, we already stated. First of all, love of means depends 
on the encounter as its condition. The flutist loves the flutes he or she encounters one way or 
another - whether in reality or only in spirit - and he or she is psychologically prepared for this 
meeting by his love for music and his experience in this field. His love of the flute also causes 
the desire when he does not already own one. That's why he buys it and tries it as soon as 
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possible with impatience. This love of the flute then leads to a real union, which renews the 
encounter of love if the flute meets the expectations of its owner. With time and practice, 
musician and flute adapt to each other and the flutist appreciates and loves his instrument to the 
point to come to feel a real affection towards it. 
This shows that love of means has the same structure that our analysis has already 
shown, one finds the moments of meeting, attraction, desire, and the union that renews the 
same meeting. 
What distinguishes both these loves is the fact that the love of means is not autonomous. 
The flutist would not like his flute if he did not play. Therefore, the flute has a real final 
causality, but an encounter of love can happen only if one loves playing the flute. Love of the 
flute presupposes the love of music and depends on it. If we did not like music, the flute would 
leave us indifferent. In all these cases we must distinguish these two loves: love of means 
caused by a good that is a means, and love of ends caused by a good that is not a means but an 
end in itself. The good that is a means being relative to the good that is an end it is correlative 
to the love for ends and depends on it for its existence. 
We therefore love in two ways: in view of the beloved good itself, or in view of another 
love and another good. The relationship of dependence implies that the love of ends is not 
necessarily accompanied by a love of means but love of means necessarily presupposes a love 
of ends. 
So far we have considered the love relationship in terms of unilateral or non-reflexive. 
However interpersonal love can take on a reciprocal form, for example the love of a partner or 
friendship. It remains to be seen whether the patterns of love that we distinguish are capable of 
a reciprocal love. Love for an end does not present particular difficulties in this regard, 
provided that the beloved is someone capable of loving in return. Values, such as truth, will not 
love us in return, even if we love them with a love for ends. But friends and spouses love each 
other and love each other, in principle at least, with a love for ends, that is to say for themselves 
and not for another love. It is then a true friendship and a mutual love to which interpersonal 
love seems to aspire. Loving without being loved is felt like a failure. We have no need to 
dwell on this subject. 
As for love of means, it is aimed primarily at things that populate our world of 
experience. The consumer society cultivates this love to an excessive degree. Some spiritual 
goods, such as education, culture, etc are normally considered to be objects of love of means. 
Such loves are clearly unilateral. 
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But we can love the human person also with a love of means. Then the person we love, 
we love him or her for the benefits he or she provides us. The student loves the master for the 
knowledge he or she transmits. The patient loves the doctor for the healing he does. The reason 
for love of means is not necessarily a spiritual or material benefit. It can also be psychological: 
the husband loves in his wife the image of his mother, the wife finds in her husband the lost 
father. As these examples show, love of means is not necessarily one-sided, it may well be 
reciprocal. The love relationship is then based on the mutual benefits that both offer to each 
other. These benefits are generally not the same. If the wife loves her husband because he is the 
image or father, the husband loves his wife for her beauty, her tenderness, etc.. 
Such loves are common in everyday life, and in fact are quite normal, according to the 
standards of love, in the sense that life in society would be impossible without them. 
Collaboration does it not imply a love of means? In addition, reciprocal love of end includes 
most often love of means. Love for each other does not exclude that we love each other also for 
the mutual benefits that this relationship brings. 
Though there is no opposition in principle between love of means and love of ends, on 
the level of human existence, a certain balance must be respected. We do not like to feel 'used' 
by others, such as when the services rendered are never returned. This situation clashes with 
our sense of justice and human dignity. In his existence as a substantial being, man is not in 
himself a means, but he is also always an end, a possible object of a love of ends. As Kant puts 
it precisely: 
"Man ...is never to be used only as means but also and simultaneously as an end in 
itself."
169
. 
Although the term 'use' is a misnomer, the quote clearly states that it is the exclusive 
love of means that destroys the respect that man owes to man. It does not impose on us the duty 
to love with a love of ends, which would be impossible, but it urges us to keep open the 
possibility of love of ends. It is particularly important to stress here that the love of ends tends 
to give way when human relationships are based on the physical, psychological, social, 
ideological and religious monopolising. In its place we discover the tyranny of the master to his 
slave, of the rich to the poor, the boss towards the worker, the sect to his followers. On a more 
intimate interpersonal relationships, the same tyranny destroyed many couples and friendships. 
In fact the tyranny of an exclusive love of means represents one of the constants of human 
suffering throughout the ages. 
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In the philosophical tradition, we find the division of love into love of means and love 
of ends in various forms. Aristotle, for example, distinguishes three kinds of friendship: 
friendship based on utility, friendship based on pleasure and the perfect friendship of the 
virtuous. He notes about the first two friendships: 
“And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that 
the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure"
170
  
The scholastic tradition means by the term 'love of concupiscence' the love of means, 
and the term 'love of friendship, love of ends. It calls mutual love of ends ‘friendship '. Today 
'friendship' means rather a non-sexual love for each other, while the term 'love' in this context is 
rather reserved to describe the love between man and woman, or love for the children. To avoid 
any misunderstanding we will use the terms ‘love of means' and ‘love of ends',' reciprocal love 
of means' and'-reciprocal love of ends'. This terminology is perhaps neither traditional nor very 
attractive, but it has the advantage of clearly identifying the different possible cases, and this is 
the aim of a rigorous terminology. 
The distinction between love of ends and love of means appears more fundamental than 
the distinction between sensory and spiritual love. It is based on the very structure of the good, 
which is not the case for the distinction between the spiritual and physical good. It is only in 
relation to the good that one can distinguish means from ends. Moreover, the distinction 
between the spiritual and the physical is not unique to the good, but applies also to other 
realities. On the other hand, our division is absolute. Love is love is for ends or love for means. 
Although the love of means implies the end, it is not at once love of means and love of ends, or 
vice versa. Existentially this distinction also seems more important. Indeed, the confusion of 
these two forms of love in human relationships is not always easy to avoid at the very time it 
becomes important to distinguish between them. How many existential dramas their confusion 
caused and how understanding this difference would have avoided these dramas? When one 
wonders if this is "really" our friend one is trying implicitly to find out whether it is a love of 
ends or a love of means. 
It is therefore important to recognise these two modalities. However, if the principle 
leaves no doubt, daily practice is more complex. Despite the legends and tales of 'evidence' of 
love, no essential features allow us to distinguish them. We can only see signs that indicate 
either with more or less precision. But a 'proof' of love in the sense of a formal proof does not 
exist, although there are signs. 
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The first of these signs, already identified by Aristotle
171
, is the temporality of love of 
means. The average love of means is directed towards an end, so it must end when that end is 
reached. We know couples where one spouse works to pay for the education of the other, and 
ends in divorce as soon as the studies are completed. Since love of means cannot last beyond 
the time when the end is reached, it is essentially temporal. By contrast the love of ends is not, 
in principle, limited in time. Since the end of this love is the very being of the beloved, there is 
no reason why this love ends as long as the beloved exists. If we love our children with a love 
of ends, they were loved, we still love them and we shall love them in the future. 
This however does not mean that all love that ceases is necessarily always a love of 
means. Love of ends may die of starvation. Indeed, love depends on the encounter of love as its 
condition, and if this condition is not renewed through the union, it cannot last. The first 
meeting does not establish love once and for all. Like any contingent life, love also needs its 
food to survive and grow. The honeymoon is the starting point, not the backbone of the life of 
love. 
In contrast, a loving relationship based on the utility, whether of a material or a 
psychological order, is normally condemned to end. At the moment this utility is no longer 
desired, or one partner refuses to make the service claimed, there is no longer strictly speaking 
a loving relationship. A marriage contracted to overcome loneliness or to solve a problem is 
compromised from its beginning. The situation may be even more dramatic if the problem is 
not always clearly recognised. But it is equally possible that a love of means lasts. A couple 
that is satisfied with a contractual relationship where each one performs a function may very 
well continue. While theoretically the love of ends is timeless and the love of means is 
temporal in practice this index is irrelevant. 
Closely related to temporality is the impersonality of the love of means. Since the 
means is self-oriented utility, the lover is only interested in factors that affect the field of utility. 
Love of means is not addressed to the person as such, as is the case in love of ends, but it is 
directed towards its utility, or what he or she means for the other. Anyone else who has the 
same utility could be subject to the same love. We love the other for his appearance, his or her 
physical beauty, or to be loved for its support, or by psychological need, in all these cases the 
relationship is in itself impersonal. Obviously, we can know the behaviour of the loved in its 
smallest details, but the need to know the loved one as such and to establish with him or her an 
existential and personal communication is absent. Even where the partner fulfils a deep 
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psychological need, for example, where he or she fulfils the role of the father or mother, the 
relationship is somehow impersonal. Despite the real intimacy of such a relationship, the 
partner cannot be recognised as a person, he or she must complete a psychological function. He 
is loved in the first place not for what he is, but for what he does, for his function. 
By its lack of existential communication, love of means implies always existential 
loneliness. Because love of means-applies primarily to things that are useful in life, we can 
translate proportionately the characteristics of this love to represent this love in human terms. 
Just as one does not feel the need for existential communication with his car while being 
sensitive to the slightest differences of operation, the love of means can be very sensitive to the 
other, without ever establishing personal contact. And with the impersonality of this love 
comes solitude, a solitude that can be all the more distressing as there reigns the appearance of 
perfect harmony based on functional co-operation. 
By contrast, love of end seeks existential communication. This communication, as 
mutual self-revelation, seeks personal transparency, as described by Karl Jaspers: it often takes 
the form of a "struggle of love"
172
. It is a struggle for the communication and reciprocity of 
love. 
Indeed, the human person is not obvious. He hides in a private sphere, jealously guarded 
behind social behaviour learned by education, experience, conviction. We do not display our 
secret garden except to the person who loves us with a love of ends, but even this revelation 
does not come without struggle with oneself and with the beloved. Modesty and even some 
self-preservation dictate us not to reveal us except bit by bit. Existential communication is a 
program of deepening mutual understanding never terminated that, compared with the harmony 
of love of means, involves clashes. From the description of Jaspers, the struggle of love is 
different from other conflicts, such as power struggles, in that it does not seek to destroy the 
other, but tries to win together with him or her. It is a struggle of solidarity that renounces any 
victory of one over the other as being contrary to the bonds of love and is driven by an absolute 
honesty trying to understand oneself without reserve as well as the beloved
173
. Finally, we 
should note that Thomas Aquinas had already a notion of this communication; in the Summa 
Theologica he speaks of: 
Amicitiae, quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam redamationem quaedam cum 
mutua communicationes
174
. 
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A final sign of love of means concerns its union. If the union of love of ends is 
characterised by otherness, love of means seeks rather an assimilation. Here again a 
comparison with the objects of daily use can help us. As the hammer is useful only if it adapts 
to the hand of man, in the same way love of means on a human level implicitly requires that the 
loved one fits the needs of the one who loves. One must bow to the dictates of another. Such an 
adaptation to the needs of the other means the assimilation of one to the other. If such an 
assimilation in some cases does not pose any problems, such as the relationship between 
teacher and students, in other cases, especially when love of means takes the place of love of 
ends, such a union of assimilation can take painful dimensions. To ensure the support of the 
beloved, the lover has to render the beloved dependant on him, he must limit his freedom. 
Because I need you, we need you to be linked to me without the possibility of leaving me. But 
the danger that the beloved may at any time assert its independence remains despite all the 
blackmail, and the lover lives in constant fear of one day finding himself without the support of 
his partner of which he has a vital need. This is the case admirably analysed by Hegel of the 
master who depends on his slave
175
. 
Again, the contrast with the union of love of ends is striking. Love of ends asserts, 
within the 'we', the freedom of the beloved, since reciprocal love of ends can only be based on a 
free choice. At the same time love of ends seeks, as already noted by Ramon Lull in the 13th 
century
176
, otherness, that is, that the identity of the beloved. Since the lover loves the beloved 
for himself, he should like him or her to be as much as possible himself or herself. The union of 
the love of ends enhanced by existential communication becomes an important factor in 
personal development, which instead of restricting freedom, makes everyone better able to 
assert his or her freedom through the decisions and choices of existence. Which does not 
oppose itself to the will of unity and communication of lovers. 
 
The encounter, a source of self-love 
 
The other pole of love, the encounter, determines the intensity of the various loves in 
the division based on the aspects of the good. The meeting as a clearing between the lover and 
his beloved allows more and less, so that a more intense encounter will have a more intense 
love, which will have more influence on the life of love. The intensity of the meeting runs a 
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whole range of scales from the substantial unity of the person and the psychological identity 
through the encounter of the couple, family, friends, to the meeting between members of the 
same society, concord, in the words of Aristotle
177
. 
In particular, the substantial unity of the person and the psychological identity, which 
follows, are a source of self-love. Through self-awareness one has a meeting with oneself, that 
is particularly intimate and intense. This meeting determines self-love, which will naturally be, 
in principle at least, a particularly strong love. Self-love is, in terms of intensity, a paradigm for 
all love. Due to this love man, as all living things, tries to preserve his existence, what we find, 
well before Darwin, in the naturalist theory of the "struggle for life" by Thomas Hobbes. 
However, the natural self-love is not only defensive. In a positive manner, it is especially 
looking for any source of personal fulfilment. 
Indeed, it is a form of love of ends. The person cannot, in principle at least, represent 
himself as a means to another love. But the love of ends wills the good of the beloved, so that 
by self-love man seeks his own good. Self-love is therefore a love of ends which is the root, in 
the sense of the condition, of fulfilment of any rights, and any search for happiness. 
One could ask if self-love is not opposed to the love of others to the point of making of 
self-love a selfish love. 
However, there is no opposition in principle between self-love and love of others as 
they are not two kinds of love, but have a difference in intensity. The other as a human being is 
no less pleasant or otherwise amiable than the self. From the perspective of love there is no 
reason to love exclusively oneself. Moreover, the friend is a greater good than oneself in the 
sense that the community of friendship is an exchange of people that brings enrichment to each, 
and meets the need to give written into the very structure of love as answer to the attraction of 
the good. The "Love one another as you love yourself" of the Gospel means exactly that. It is 
not only to love others with a love of ends, it is a command to love with the same intensity with 
which one loves oneself. This is the very perfection of love. 
However, although there is no opposition in principle between self-love and love of 
others, it may be that the conditioning has an adverse effect thus breaking the balance between 
self-love and love of others. The child who was spoiled by his parents and who has not learned 
justice towards others nor respect for others, will have difficulty to see in another person 
somebody to be loved by a love of ends. But the child who has not received a reassuring love of 
his parents can have the same reaction. Self-love then develops into egoism, which knows only 
                                                 
177
 Aristotle EN 1167a22 IX 6. 
NOËTIC AND PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS OF LOVE 
54 
 
a love of means to others. This is a real love of ends for oneself, that takes, however, an 
exclusive form. Self-love then opposes itself to the love of others. Based on the meeting with 
self, egotism is a purely conditioned love taking on the form of an absolute. 
That such growth interferes with the development of the whole man, Aristotle has 
already shown with great finesse: the egotist refuses the greatest good of man, his friend, since 
all the while wanting the world's goods, selfishness waives the most valuable asset. At the heart 
of the egotist, we find a negation, that of love-of-ends for others, and it is this denial that makes 
the selfish person so deeply unhappy by separating him from his own happiness
178
. 
In contrast to the situation encountered, equally dramatic, is the one who loves himself 
too little. Thus the child who is not successful, who is not pretty, who can’t do anything right, 
or is insidiously compared to a brother or sister who is more successful, in short, the child 
rejected by his entourage will have difficulty loving itself. 
 
Genesis of self-love. 
These two extremes - selfishness and self-rejection - illustrate the importance of self-
love in the economy of love. Self-love determines the life of love. As such, self-love is the first 
that we know and is at the basis of our relationships with others. Without wanting to affirm 
with Helvetius that self-love is acquired, it is nevertheless true that the child learns, through his 
early emotional experiences, love in a particular way. In this development we find certain 
stages. 
The basics of self-love are laid in early childhood, and the balance of our environment 
in terms of love determines in large measure our capacity to love and the history of our love. In 
order to be able to love someone with a love of ends, we must see oneself as a good. We need 
to appear to ourselves as loveable as such. But the only evidence that we are loveable, is to be 
loved with a love of ends. This is the function of the love of parents for the child. This love 
teaches him or her that in all circumstances he or she is surrounded by a love of ends. Even if 
he is impossible and difficult, he is loved with an unconditional love, and that's what gives him 
the right to love himself with a love of ends. 
The situation just described is the norm in the genesis of self-love. Unfortunately it is 
not always respected. Two factors can disturb the normal and usual development. Either the 
child is simply not liked or loved, or the child is not loved by a love of ends, but a love of 
means. 
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The child who is not 'desired', who is 'too much', who is rejected can obviously not see 
himself as loveable in himself. He will live without consciously loving himself. 
It is also possible that the child is not loved for itself but for its ‘usefulness’. The mother 
who loves her daughter "because she is a good housewife," or seeking the ideal in his son of the 
man she did not meet in her husband. The father who projects the ideal of a career on his sons, 
or who gets along better with his daughter than with his wife. These situations are even more 
dramatic as parents have every opportunity to educate the child. and as they are probably not 
aware of the situation. Faced with his or her parents the child is helpless and unprotected. In all 
these cases, the child is in front of an insoluble dilemma. Or he rejects such love at a price of 
not being loved at all, or he plays the game. If he plays the game, he learns that he must 'buy' 
the love of his parents. To be loved, he must be wise, a "man", etc.. He could not develop his 
own capabilities and his own personality, and does not know by experience what the love of 
ends means. 
We should not forget, however, that parental love is a condition, not a cause of self-
love. Although the practice may create serious obstacles, at least in theory it is always possible 
to overcome negative conditioning. Is it what psychiatry in this area seeks to achieve? On the 
other hand, the emotional first meeting with oneself is followed by others. We meet every day 
of our existence with different moods and attitudes. We are influenced in our appreciation of 
ourselves through meetings and events of life, so our self-love continues to evolve. This further 
conditioning can dramatically change the course of self-love. 
Just as self-love is conditioned by early experiences the emotional life of mutual love 
between two people depends for a great deal on their first meetings. It shows in some sense the 
direction their love will probably take. Therefore, the analysis of these meetings can be 
particularly useful when the relationship becomes problematic. When we understand the 
motivations and circumstances of the early life of love we can better understand its history. 
This story consists in principle of ever-changing encounters, since, as we have seen, the union 
of love is also the renewal of encounter. Each meeting conditions thus the life of love, and it is 
the history of these daily meetings that establishes the 'intensity curve' of love. Moreover, given 
the importance of the meeting, the change of atmosphere can make a significant evolution in 
the life of love. The couple who notes that its meetings become a routine, or are increasingly 
filled with discussions outside their relationship - the management of the family, children's 
education, issues of work - such a couple is running away from the encounter of love, whether 
intended or not. But understanding the relationship, making a commitment to discovering the 
partner can only make the experience of love deeper. 
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The foregoing analysis of love was a typically noëtic one. Love saves man from 
solipsism, since it draws him outside himself towards the good. Without love man would be 
imprisoned in his own world. His intellect assimilates the world around, to the degree that one 
can think the universe sitting in one’s chair. His drives are also self-centred. Love, on the other 
hand, draws man outside himself to the good about him. 
 
Paradigmatic thought cannot conceive the good as something that exists outside man. It 
can only accept material, that has to be formed This means that a paradigmatic analysis of love 
misses this point, it must reinterpret the good179. Thus Platon identifies the good with beauty. 
Diotima in teaching Socrates in the ways of love says: 
“He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see 
the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly 
perceive a nature of wondrous beauty...”180 
 
Sartre gives a paradigmatic interpretation of love and existence too. Sartre’s division in 
“en-soi”, “pour-soi” and “pour-autrui” puts him typically in the paradigmatic tradition. I am 
either “pour-soi”, the source of a blue-print of existence, or the material on which the blue-print 
is impressed, “en-soi”, or the product of the project of the other, “pour-autrui” As a result love 
becomes a project, and this project must lead to conflict
181
. For at the moment the project of 
love works, the “lover seduces the beloved” and the beloved loves in turn, the latter develops 
the project of loving, and makes of the beloved an “pour autrui”182. A reciprocal exchange is 
impossible for paradigmatic thought, either the one is the architect of love or else the subject 
that receives the love of the lover. This is also the way that Jean-Paul Sartre, who gives a 
paradigmatic interpretation of existence, understands love. For Sartre we want to feel justified 
to exist by love
183
 instead of feeling ourselves "too much", we would like that the freedom of 
others, by wanting freely our existence, justifies it. Driven by love we should want to seize the 
freedom of the other as such. Love does not seek to submit another by power as does the tyrant 
who does not care about love, but he wants that the other freely offers his freedom: 
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"He wants to be loved by a freedom and demands that this freedom as liberty is no 
longer free."
184
 
This means that the lover has to seduce the beloved, and he does it by offering himself 
as a fascinating object; he offers himself to the beloved as necessary, in the world. He plays, for 
instance, the role of the citizen of the world who opens up an unknown world to the girl185. 
But in reality, he is subject to a model that he projects onto himself. He plays a role. If the 
seduction is successful, the beloved loves in his or her turn. But since love is the project to be 
loved, the beloved then tries to seduce the lover in turn. As a result love for Sartre is: "a system 
of undefined cross-referencing "186, without any reciprocity that can be established. And 
Sartre to conclude that love is a source of perpetual dissatisfaction, of perpetual insecurity, and, 
perpetual shame of the lover. For Sartre love can in the end, only lead to conflict187. 
 
Our noëtic interpretation of love does not exclude conflict, in as much as a conflict 
between persons that love each other is quite possible. But it does not make of conflict the 
inevitable conclusion of the love relationship. Rather it sees love as a real relationship that may, 
for other reasons than love itself, include conflicts. But, being a real relationship, conflict does 
not mean that one does no longer love. I can be angry with my wife and still love her. 
 
On page 4 we wrote: “a paradigmatic world has as its final value beauty, whereas a 
noëtic world has as it highest moral value the good.” One could ask then if a paradigmatic love 
of the beautiful is not possible, as Plato presented it. Indeed beauty is a final cause, but on the 
level of exemplary causes. If the good is on the level of being, beauty is on the level of 
appearance. And it is also true that we have a tendency to consider beautiful those we love with 
a love of ends. The good we love is beautiful for us, which does not imply that the beautiful is 
the good we love. Indeed there are beautiful beings that we don’t love.188 
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Beauty as an end on the level of exemplary causes appeals to our understanding and one 
could define it as the clarity of forms
189
. Jolivet writes: 
Beauty is a source of joy. The beautiful is delectable; it enchants and fills with delight; 
it provokes desire and love. It is therefore a kind of good, to wit the good of knowledge.
190
 
As a matter of fact, the divisions of Beauty are closer to the divisions of the intelligence 
rather than the divisions of the good. We don’t distinguish an end and a means beauty, but 
natural and man-made beauty, in a similar manner as we distinguish between logical and 
ontological truth. 
 
A purely noëtic world understands the world as it is but does not change it, it is an 
entirely static world without improvement. In this sense Socrates’ enterprise to improve life 
through the love of beauty is still valid. This is a love of values, and excludes the love of 
persons, which in a paradigmatic framework leads, as Sartre maintains, inevitably to conflict, 
and thus to a negation of love itself. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
Noëtic thought is based on insight, which is a tricky business. Insight cannot be 
proven, and it can be mistaken. I can think that all people are good, from my experience and 
than discover that this is wrong by further experience. But not entirely so. I discover that most 
people are good and some bad. Insight is a process that continuously corrects itself, a process 
where experience counts. Which may be the reason that in pre-industrial societies, the aged, 
who have the experience, are highly esteemed. It is the task of the philosopher to develop his 
thought on those insights that seem to be irrefutable, even if they cannot be proven. So, if 
philosophy tells me that man is a substantial existence, endowed with the faculties of love, 
thought, and imagination this is surely not wrong. Where I may go wrong is in determining 
how men love, think, and use their imagination in art and science. 
Paradigmatic thought: is based on inspiration. Inspiration does not depend on the 
accumulation of experience of the world, but on the flash of inner experience. And this is as 
uncertain as insight in noëtic thought. But Paradigmatic thought has an advantage, in that it can 
be verified by further experience, except in those fields where experience is not possible, such 
as philosophy. It is generally accepted today that hypothetical thought in the experimental 
sciences is based on inspirations
191
 but they can be verified or falsified by experiment. 
Inspirational thought in philosophy is another matter. There experimental verification can lead 
to much suffering. In order to know whether Plato’s Republic is viable, one should have to try 
it for some generations. This is what happened with Marxism, and the end result was negative, 
but only after much human suffering. Ernst Bloch, quite rightly therefore, maintains that the 
role of philosophy is to draw up a list of human aspirations – all based on inspirations – and 
then see which ones can be made true
192
. 
 
If insight is for the aged, inspiration is for the young. It is no wonder therefore that 
many scientific discoveries, especially in the mathematics are made at a relatively early age. An 
inspirational world is a world of the young, but inspiration without insight can lead to much 
sorrow, for it can be entirely out of touch with reality. One may experiment with all kinds of 
inspirations about family, marriage, parent-child relations, and some may turn out to be right, 
but the risk of having totally destroyed lives at the end of the experimentation is always 
possible.  
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 Cf Jarosson, who shows clearly that scientific thought « marche ... d’un pas d’écrevisse vers un but indéfini » 
192
 Cf Bloch, p. 166, on the « Docta spes » 
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Each one has its presuppositions. Noëtic thought that the world about me is rational, or 
at least accessible to reason. Paradigmatice thought; that the world about me is adaptable to my 
inspirations, can be the instrument of its verification. 
 
Our analyses have shown that paradigmatic thought applied to society leads finally to 
see man as a function of society (Marx), applied to love it leads to solipsism (Sartre), and 
applied to natural theology it leads to atheism (Nietsche). One should therefore drop 
paradigmatic thought and turn to noëtic thought. And indeed, there are quite some noëtic 
thinkers. There is the Aristotelian tradition
193
; Jaspers, Heidegger Popper
194
, Bergson
195
, Martin 
Buber
196
 are also noëtic thinkers in modern times. 
 
 On the other hand, without paradigmatic thought there is no change. A purely 
noëtic world understands it but cannot bring any change. If we want to improve our world, we 
must turn to paradigmatic thought. One could try to revive the experiment of Socrates, but in 
view of the nihilism of paradigmatic thought this would be difficult.. A better way would be to 
turn to the modern sciences, who are paradigmatic in their method
197
. On the basis of the 
findings of those sciences, in particular the social sciences, one could propose projects that put 
in value the noëtic findings of man and reality. “A Theory of Justice” by John Rawls is a good 
example of paradigmatic thought for the betterment of society. It is paradigmatic for Rawls 
bases his theory of justice on the fiction of a social contract between equally interested rational 
individuals, placing himself in the tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant
198
. His work gives an 
outline of what justice should be, it is a blueprint of justice
199
. Since paradigmatic thought 
presents blueprints, the future of this thought is the presentation of human ideals. 
                                                 
193
 A good example is Aristotle’s treatment of political society. Following a crtitique of Platon’s Republic, he 
analyses different political regimes, in order to find finally « the best ». This is a very good example of the noëtic 
method. Cf. Aristotle, »Politics », passim. 
194
 CfPopper nowhere gives a clear definition of truth, but he adheres to the correspondance therory, as opposed to 
the coherence theory. Cf Popper Conjectures, pp.224 f. Cf aussi Popper, Conjectures, p.357 : ... »that I believe in 
man.......I mean man as he is ;» 
195
 Cf Bergson, p.1198 : « On construit a priori une certaine représentation, on convient de dire que c’est l’idée de 
Dieu ; on en déduit alors les caractères que le monde devrait présenter ; et si le monde ne les présente pas, on en 
conclut que Dieu est inexistant. Comment ne pas voir que si la philosophie est oeuvre d’expérience et de 
raisonnement, elle doit suivre la méthode inverse, interroger l’expérience... » 
196
 Cf p. 83 : « Stehe ich einem Menschen als Du gegenüber, sprech das Grundwort Ich-Du zu ihm, ist er kein 
Ding unter Dingen und nicht aus Dingen  bestehend. » 
197
 Cf Jarrosson 
198
 Rawls, p. 11, VIII. 
199
 For a incisive analysis of the contract theory, and Rawls,  cf. Ankerl, « Relativity » 
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 At the personal level, leading a paradigmatic life is rather discouraging, for one 
tries to make true a paradigm, an ideal. But this is impossible, for the ideal is always beyond 
what I do, and the ideal is as such unrealisable. The ideal of Mozart, is not Mozart himself. In a 
paradigmatically led existence, one measures the distance that separates us from the ideal. 
Which is depressive. A better way to live would be to base one’s existence on a noëtic 
understanding and then try to improve this. Instead of trying to make true an impossible ideal, 
one tries each day to improve the real achievements that one has already succeeded. The eyes 
are not turned towards an impossible future, but towards the achievements in the past and the 
present. 
 
 All education is paradigmatic, but here also one could distinguish education that 
makes of the pupil, or the child, the raw material of a program of education, or an education 
that recognises the singular identity of the child, and tries to develop this. This is the difference 
between a paradigmatic centralised education and a noëtically orientated education. The 
paradigmatic education has a love of means for the child, whereas the noëtically orientated 
education has a love of ends for the child. 
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